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515 
TAXES AND ABILITY TO PAY IN MUNICIPAL 
BANKRUPTCY 
John Patrick Hunt
*
 
Abstract: Scholars and commentators have argued that municipalities can and should use 
bankruptcy to shed unwanted liabilities, particularly employee healthcare and pension 
commitments. Courts increasingly have agreed: Detroit’s approved bankruptcy plan cut 
pensions, and the bankruptcy court overseeing the bankruptcy of Stockton, California 
brought down barriers to pension-cutting. Both courts found their way around state 
provisions arguably protecting municipal pensions. 
Now that pension-cutting in bankruptcy has momentum, we can expect to hear arguments 
for using bankruptcy not just in cases like Detroit and Stockton where the municipality 
cannot meet all its obligations, but also in cases where residents or politicians come to regret 
municipal promises to workers. 
This Article presents the most sustained, straightforward, and comprehensive argument to 
date that existing law requires bankruptcy courts to provide relief only when municipalities 
are reasonably unable to meet their obligations. The legislative history of the municipal 
bankruptcy statutes consistently sounds this theme, and judicial precedents are in agreement. 
Congress did not provide a clear standard for courts to apply when looking at tax levels in 
municipal bankruptcy. Although the legislative history and case law provide some support 
for the proposition that municipalities should be required to tax at the level that maximizes 
revenue, the Article suggests a more moderate criterion: absent a compelling explanation, 
courts could require that a municipality tax at the top of its peer group as a condition of 
bankruptcy eligibility and plan confirmation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New life suffuses American municipal bankruptcy. For nearly eighty 
years, filings were rare
1
 and large filings nonexistent. Municipal 
bankruptcy was not even covered in leading bankruptcy casebooks,
2
 and 
                                                     
1. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State 
Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 72 (2015) (“Since municipal bankruptcy first entered federal 
law in 1934, fewer than 700 cases have been filed.”). 
2. Compare ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
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commentators regularly questioned its usefulness.
3
 But recently every 
year has seemed to bring a new superlative for bankruptcy: Jefferson 
County, Alabama’s bankruptcy was the largest by dollar amount when it 
was filed in 2011.
4
 In 2012, Stockton, California became the largest city 
by population ever to have sought bankruptcy protection,
5
 only to be 
surpassed in 2013 when Detroit’s filing riveted the eyes of the nation on 
a process that led to a “Grand Bargain,” which reached far beyond the 
municipal limits to the halls of the country’s best-known and most 
prestigious cultural foundations.
6
 
After the resolution of the Stockton and Detroit cases, municipal 
bankruptcy is part of the new normal: In California, San Bernardino 
lingers in bankruptcy
7
 while Vallejo reportedly teeters on the edge of a 
                                                     
CREDITORS 914–18 (6th ed. 2009) (table of cases indicating no citations in casebook to municipal 
provisions of Bankruptcy Code), with ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 834–38 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing municipal 
bankruptcy). 
3. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 
27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353–54 (2010) [hereinafter Kimhi, Solution in Search of a Problem] 
(“[B]ankruptcy law, at least in its current form, is not a sensible solution for urban economic 
crises . . . .”); Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 633, 635 (2008) (contrasting Chapter 9 with “other better . . . solutions” to the problem of 
municipal insolvency such as state control boards); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, 
When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
425, 494 (1993) (“In its present form, [municipal bankruptcy] serves little use . . . .”). 
4. See Dan Alexander, Biggest Bankruptcy Before Detroit, Alabama County Stages Comeback, 
FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2013/12/05/biggest-
bankruptcy-before-detroit-alabama-county-stages-comeback/ [https://perma.cc/C2WV-ZPV6] 
(stating that Jefferson County, Alabama bankruptcy in 2011 was “the largest municipal bankruptcy 
in U.S. history before Detroit”).  
5. See Jim Christie, Stockton, California Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 28, 2012, 11:49 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-
idUSBRE85S05120120629 [https://perma.cc/ST3P-ZDUG] (“Stockton, California became the 
largest city to file for bankruptcy in U.S. history on Thursday after years of fiscal mismanagement 
and a housing market crash left it unable to pay its workers, pensioners and bondholders.”). 
6. See Randy Kennedy, ‘Grand Bargain’ Saves the Detroit Institute of the Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit-institute-
of-arts.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TPW3-8RAH] (describing generally a deal in which private 
foundations would contribute to save the Detroit Institute of the Arts); Sandra Svoboda, The DIA 
Post Detroit Bankruptcy? New Provisions for Funding the Museum and Pensions, NEXT CHAPTER 
DETROIT (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nextchapterdetroit.com/thediasfuture/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4WQ-6WLK] (reporting commitments of $125 million from the Ford 
Foundation, $100 million from the Kresge Foundation, $40 million from the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation, and $30 million from the John S. and James L. Knight foundation, among others). 
7. San Bernardino filed for bankruptcy on August 1, 2012. See Press Release, City of San 
Bernardino, City of San Bernardino Bankruptcy Petition Filed (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.ci.san-
bernardino.ca.us/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?blobid=14004 [https://perma.cc/4QE6-MLYL]. 
The city did not file a plan of adjustment until May 29, 2015. See generally Plan for the Adjustment 
of Debts of the City of San Bernardino, California (May 29, 2015), In re City of San Bernardino, 
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second filing.
8
 Atlantic City, New Jersey threatens to become the first 
New Jersey municipality to enter bankruptcy since the Great 
Depression.
9
 And mighty Chicago could eclipse even the Detroit 
bankruptcy.
10
 
This reinvigoration of bankruptcy coincides with a change in the 
standard image of the archetypal municipal creditor: once seen as a 
distant bondholder, now more and more the creditor is identified as a 
retired worker.
11
 The unsustainability, real or apparent, of municipal 
pensions and health care benefits has emerged as a favorite topic not just 
of bond analysts,
12
 but also of organizations charged with promoting the 
broader public interest.
13
 The idea that public pensions are too high has 
taken a firm hold in discourse, even though some recent prophecies of 
imminent municipal financial collapse have not materialized as 
                                                     
499 B.R. 776 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 6:12-bk-28006-MJ).  
8. See Melanie Hicken, Once Bankrupt, Vallejo Still Can’t Afford Its Pricey Pensions, 
CNNMONEY (Mar. 10, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/pf/vallejo-pensions/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Z9R-BH5E]. 
9. Atlantic City leaders reportedly met in late January 2016 to consider a possible bankruptcy 
filing. Romy Varghese & Terrence Dopp, Atlantic City’s Road Out of Distress Clouded by State’s 
Control, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2016, 5:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-
01-26/atlantic-city-s-road-out-of-distress-clouded-by-state-s-control [https://perma.cc/DKV4-
QWB9]; see also Ted Sherman, What Are the Chances of Atlantic City Going Bankrupt?, NJ.COM 
(May 10, 2015, 2:49 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2015/05/what_are_the_chances_ 
of_atlantic_city_going_bankru.html [https://perma.cc/Q9Q2-A7E9]. 
10. As of late January, 2016, the governor and Illinois legislative leaders reportedly planned to 
introduce a bill that would authorize bankruptcy for the City of Chicago and the Chicago School 
District. Stefano Esposito et al., Plan for Takeover, Bankruptcy Is ‘Lifeline’ for CPS, Republicans 
Say, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 9:46 AM), http://chicagobeta.suntimes.wordpress-prod-
wp.aggrego.com/news/7/71/1265024/cps-takeover-bankruptcy-option-gop-legislative-plan 
[https://perma.cc/6V2S-UEPW]; see also Ted Dabrowski, Chicago Slides Toward Bankruptcy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-dabrowski/chicago-slides-
toward-ban_b_7287366.html [https://perma.cc/7C5L-UWN9]. 
11. See infra Section I.B. 
12. See, e.g., Janney Capital Markets, Are Pension Obligation Bonds as Bad as Some Critics 
Say?, MUN. BOND MKT. MONTHLY, May 1, 2015, at 1, 2 (calling attention to “[c]redit deterioration 
and/or negative rating actions . . . in the states of Kansas, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania partly as a 
result of dwindling pension assets (mostly because of underfunding) when compared to rising 
liabilities”); Janney Capital Markets, Municipal Bond Market Credit Analyst Survey - First Annual, 
MUN. BOND MKT. MONTHLY, Apr. 6, 2015, at 1 (“The most important issue/trend facing the 
municipal bond market is currently Public Pensions . . . . 86% of municipal credit analysts polled 
included the category in their top five, according to our survey results.”). 
13. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES: SHORTFALLS IN FUNDING FOR 
PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 38 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/ 
uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/Pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNS2-7EYV] (“For 
a number of America’s largest cities, the bill for public sector retirement benefits already threatens 
strained budgets. And more pressures are on the horizon as unpaid pension bills in a variety of sizes, 
as well as retiree health costs, continue to accumulate.”). 
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predicted.
14
 
Municipal bankruptcy as process and retiree as creditor come together 
in recent decisions upending the longstanding conventional wisdom that 
public pensions cannot be cut in bankruptcy.
15
 The trend started small, 
when a bankruptcy judge in October 2012 approved a plan of adjustment 
for the tiny city of Central Falls, Rhode Island that included pension cuts 
of up to fifty-five percent.
16
 Things got serious when the Detroit 
bankruptcy court held—despite a pension-protecting state constitutional 
provision—that city pensions could be impaired17 and then approved a 
plan of adjustment that reduces general employee pensions by 4.5%.
18
 
The third decision—the one that makes a trend—came from California, 
where the court overseeing the Stockton bankruptcy rejected arguments 
that pensions administered by the state’s gargantuan California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) could not be impaired.19 
Although Stockton did not actually try to impair pensions in its plan of 
                                                     
14. For example, in December 2010, analyst Meredith Whitney stated on the television news 
program 60 Minutes that there could be 50 to 100 or more “sizable” municipal bond defaults and 
that defaults “will amount to hundreds of billions of dollars” and that the predicted cataclysm would 
be “something to worry about within the next twelve months.” Steve Kroft, State Budgets: Day of 
Reckoning, 60 MINUTES (Dec. 19, 2010), at 12:36–12:38, 13:12–13:15, http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
videos/state-budgets-day-of-reckoning/ [https://perma.cc/5FEM-B94Q]. Nothing approaching this 
scale of default has yet occurred. For example, total reported debts in the Detroit bankruptcy were 
$18 billion. Chris Christoff, Detroit’s Record $18 Billion Bankruptcy Will End Tonight, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-10/detroit-asks-to-
end-record-municipal-bankruptcy-snyder-says-1- [https://perma.cc/GHG6-2LVC]. 
15. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Pensions Be Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal 
Bankruptcy? 1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 13-33, 2013) (“As recently as five years 
ago, conventional wisdom held that political and legal obstacles made it impossible to restructure 
pensions in bankruptcy.”). 
16. See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2012, at A21.  
17. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149–54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
18. See generally In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (confirming 
Detroit’s plan of adjustment). Police and firefighters would see pension cuts of 2.25% with a 
reduced cost-of-living adjustment of one percent. Alissa Priddle & Matt Helms, Retiree Breaks 
down During Hearing for Objectors to Detroit’s Plan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 15, 2014), 
http://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/Retiree-breaks-down-during-hearing-for-objectors-to-Detroits-
plan-a-530371 [https://perma.cc/8N6V-E76Q].  
19. In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 55–60 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting arguments that 
CalPERS pension impairment is impeded by California “vested rights” doctrine, California statute 
forbidding rejection of CalPERS servicing contracts, and California statute providing for lien on 
municipal assets upon termination of CalPERS servicing contract, and suggesting that “executory 
municipal pension plans” could be modified under the standards set by the Supreme Court for 
rejection of collective bargaining agreements in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 
(1984)). The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal of the Stockton 
decision, primarily on the ground that the appeal was equitably moot. Franklin High Yield Tax-Free 
Income Fund v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 542 B.R. 261, 278 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
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adjustment,
20
 the decision may be even more significant than the Detroit 
decision because of the sheer size of the system in question.
21
 And even 
though California public pensions have not been cut to date, both the 
Vallejo
22
 and the Stockton
23
 bankruptcies featured cuts to retiree health 
benefits. 
Because municipal bankruptcy is becoming more viable in general, 
cities might be expected to try to employ their newly useful tool in more 
situations. In particular, municipalities might decide to use bankruptcy 
not just when they face otherwise unfixable fiscal emergencies, but 
whenever they find it, on balance, desirable to impair creditors.
24
 And 
the growing perception that municipal retirees’ benefits are too high 
suggests that pensions and health benefits may be the target of a new 
round of municipal bankruptcies, motivated by a desire not to raise taxes 
to meet existing commitments. 
This Article argues that Congress did not intend for municipal 
bankruptcy to be used in such a way. A review of the legislative history 
of the municipal bankruptcy statutes—six in all contain relevant 
history—shows that Congress consistently intended, from the first acts 
in the 1930s through the last relevant enactment in the 1980s, that 
municipalities use bankruptcy only when they could not reasonably pay 
their debts.
25
 Bankruptcy has always been for municipalities that cannot 
                                                     
20. Indeed, non-pension creditors complained in their unsuccessful appeal they were the victims 
of unfair discrimination in light of the failure to impair pensions. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 
2, 57–62, Stockton, 542 B.R. 261 (No. EC-14-1550). In San Bernardino, it appears that the city’s 
recent Plan of Adjustment follows Stockton in impairing retiree health benefits but not pensions. 
See Disclosure Statement with Respect to the Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of San 
Bernardino, California at 7, San Bernardino City Prof’l Firefighters Local 891 v. City of San 
Bernardino (In re City of San Bernardino), 545 B.R. 14 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 12-bk-28006-
MJ). 
21. CalPERS reported assets of over $301 billion as of June 30, 2015. See CALPERS, 2014-15 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2015, at 3, 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/L99T-DBXE]. 
22. Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486402778541450 
[https://perma.cc/Z8ZM-SAP5] (“Vallejo’s restructuring . . . calls for the city to . . . cut payments 
for retiree health care . . . .”). 
23. Stockton, 526 B.R. at 60 (“One result of this case is that the City terminated its program for 
lifetime retiree health benefits valued . . . at nearly $550 million for existing retirees.”). 
24. Municipal bankruptcy, unlike other forms of bankruptcy, does require insolvency as a 
prerequisite for filing, but as discussed below it is not clear how much of a barrier this requirement 
really is to the determined municipality. 
25. The 1994 Orange County bankruptcy may be an exception. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 159–64 (1998) (describing failure of 
property tax increase proposed to help resolve Orange County bankruptcy and resulting media 
description of county residents as “wealthy ‘deadbeats’ who refused to pay their bills”). However, it 
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pay, not for municipalities that just do not want to pay. 
Moreover, the history demonstrates that tax increases, and not just 
spending cuts, were to be on the table as means of achieving solvency. If 
anything, Congress has shown greater interest in tax increases than in 
spending cuts in debates over the prerequisites for relief in municipal 
bankruptcy. Municipal bankruptcy is not a way to ensure that budgets 
are balanced by spending cuts
26
 instead of tax increases.
27
 
The relatively sparse case law on municipal bankruptcy buttresses the 
argument. Courts have relieved cities like Central Falls,
28
 Detroit,
29
 
Vallejo,
30
 Stockton,
31
 and San Bernardino
32
 that credibly showed they 
                                                     
seems possible that the bankruptcy resulted from a misunderstanding of the law so the case may be 
of limited relevance. See id. at 111–12. In filing for bankruptcy protection, the supervisors’  
intention was to prevent a run on the [Orange County] investment pool by freezing the funds in 
the pool, thus preventing the local government investors from withdrawing their money and the 
Wall Street firms from taking any more of the securities that they held as collateral . . . . But 
there were allowances in the bankruptcy [code] that seemed to exclude the reverse repurchase 
agreements between the Wall Street firms and the county treasurer. (New York Times, 1994a). 
In fact, many Wall Street firms withdrew their collateral . . . . [Four firms] all sold collateral in 
the days right after the bankruptcy . . . . [I]t is clear that the bankruptcy filings did not have the 
intended impact of stopping the Wall Street firms from withdrawing the collateral. 
Id. at 111–12. 
26. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1195–1205 
(2014) (describing potential criteria for evaluating minimum acceptable levels of municipal service 
in bankruptcy). 
27. Cf. Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
1399, 1458 (2012) (criticizing proposals for allowing states to seek bankruptcy protection: “[w]ith 
state bankruptcy proposals, however, the Rawlsian veil of legislation becomes embarrassingly 
threadbare. There is no doubt whose ox is to be gored by state bankruptcy: it is that of organized 
labor. Public employees’ unions, not municipal bondholders or taxpayers, are the clear target of 
state bankruptcy. State bankruptcy proposals make no pretense of even being a means of mitigating 
the procyclical fiscal problems facing states”). 
28. See Grace Wyler, Central Falls Files for Bankruptcy After Union Fails to Agree to Pension 
Cuts, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2011, 1:07 PM) (quoting state-appointed receiver Robert Flanders as 
saying, “[s]ervices have been cut to the bone . . . taxes have been raised to the maximum level 
allowable”). 
29. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 119–21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (describing Detroit’s 
population and job losses and substandard police and fire services). 
30. See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 408 B.R. 
280, 294 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009), aff’g In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813-A-9, 2008 WL 4180008 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (describing the low level of services provided in Vallejo at time of 
its bankruptcy filing). 
31. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789–90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (describing 
Stockton’s “service delivery insolvency” and infeasibility of property tax increases in light of 
California’s Proposition 13); Joanne Lau, Note, Modifying or Terminating Pension Plans Through 
Chapter 9 Bankruptcies with a Focus on California, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1975, 1976–77 (2013) 
(detailing Stockton’s high crime rate and arguing that “[c]itizens who are able to leave the city are 
doing so as a result”); see also discussion infra Section III.A. 
32. See In re City of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 787 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (“[A]fter taking 
steps to cut costs and raise revenue, the City—faced with a 45.9 million dollar cash deficit—had 
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were in deep, bona fide distress and could not raise revenues by raising 
taxes.
33
 Courts have denied relief to municipalities that could have raised 
taxes to meet their obligations.
34
 And in Stockton at least, the court 
found the city eligible for bankruptcy as a way of making revenue 
increases feasible.
35
 
The policy against opportunism finds expression in at least four 
different statutory provisions: the requirement that municipalities be 
insolvent
36
 to commence a bankruptcy case, the requirement that cases
37
 
and plans
38
 be filed in good faith, and the requirements that bankruptcy 
plans be “in the best interests of creditors”39 and be “fair and equitable” 
to dissenting classes of creditors.
40
 
To be sure, it could be argued that conditioning bankruptcy relief on 
the city’s achieving a particular tax level impermissibly invades the 
city’s (or state’s) authority, and thus violates the Bankruptcy Code 
(Code) or the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
41
 But it does not 
appear that any court has embraced such an argument, and the legislative 
history suggests that any such concern is cured by the fact that the court 
is simply applying conditions to relief that the bankrupt municipality is 
affirmatively seeking.
42
 Although it is conceivable, particularly after 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
43
 that the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions could bar courts from considering 
tax levels as part of determining whether to grant relief, courts that 
consider tax levels are not changing the terms of entrenched programs. 
Nor are they threatening a reduction in federal financial benefits 
                                                     
little choice but to restructure its debt.”).  
33. For general discussion of the poor health of municipally distressed cities, see generally 
Anderson, supra note 26, at 1130–51. 
34. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 420–21 (1943); Fano v. Newport Heights 
Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1940); In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal 
Dist., 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). 
35. Stockton, 493 B.R. at 790. 
36. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1)(3) (2012). 
37. Id. § 921(c). 
38. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012) into Chapter 9); id. § 1129(a)(3) 
(requiring that plan be filed in good faith). 
39. Id. § 943. 
40. Id. § 901 (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) into Chapter 9); id. § 1129(a)(1) (requiring 
that a plan be fair and equitable to dissenting creditor classes). 
41. See infra Section IV.A. 
42. See infra Section IV.A. 
43. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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anywhere near as large as the reduction the states faced in Sebelius.
44
 
Although it seems clear that Congress wanted bankruptcy courts to 
take tax levels into account in municipal bankruptcy, it is less clear just 
how they are supposed to do so. The Article evaluates three possible 
specific criteria that bankruptcy courts could use, each of which has 
some support in the legislative history, case law, or both. The first can be 
called “top-of-the-hill” criterion;45 this criterion would require that the 
municipality tax at the revenue-maximizing level as a condition of 
bankruptcy eligibility or plan confirmation. The second is the “share-
some-pain” criterion, which has some support in the Stockton case. 
Under this criterion, relief would be conditioned on imposing a 
substantial tax increase. The third criterion is called the “top-of-the-
range.” This criterion would require that the debtor tax at the top of a 
range of comparable municipalities. 
None of the criteria is perfect, but the Article suggests that a 
combination of the three criteria has merit: a municipality could be 
required to tax at the top of the range absent an adequate explanation. 
One adequate explanation, based on the top-of-the-hill criterion, would 
be that taxing at the top of the range would actually reduce revenue. 
Another possible explanation, related to the share-some-pain criterion 
and embraced in the Stockton case, would be that the bankruptcy itself 
will enable revenue increases to pay creditors. Although the top-of-the-
range criterion will engender debate, particularly over what 
municipalities are “comparable” to the debtor, it implements the 
congressional will in a way that is familiar to legal actors; peer-group 
comparisons are already widely used in the law. 
This Article is not the first to suggest that bankruptcy courts should 
condition relief on tax increases to combat municipal opportunism. 
Professor Clayton Gillette has made that argument consistently.
46
 It is, 
                                                     
44. See infra note 291 and accompanying text. 
45. See Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN STATES 
GO BROKE 99, 105–06 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds. 2012) (“[O]ne might contend 
that a locality must tax to the top of its revenue hill — the point at which increases in tax rates 
generate reductions in tax collections because taxpayers exit the jurisdiction — before it can be 
considered insolvent” and eligible for bankruptcy protection); Andrew Haughwout et al., Local 
Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 570, 570 (2004) 
(attempting to specify “revenue hills” for selected cities). 
46. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 325–28 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism] 
(discussing potential opportunistic use of municipal bankruptcy and arguing that “allowing federal 
bankruptcy judges to impose resource adjustments on defaulting municipalities that appear to lack 
political will as opposed to financial resources can serve the . . . purpose[] of vindicating central 
governments’ interest in . . . minimizing local use of bankruptcy for strategic purposes”); Clayton P. 
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however, the first to bring to bear a comprehensive review of the 
legislative history
47
 and case law of municipal bankruptcy. It is also the 
first to consider and evaluate specific tests the bankruptcy court might 
use in determining just how high municipal taxes must be before a 
municipality can invoke the federal bankruptcy power to reduce its 
debts. 
I. SETTING THE TABLE: MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY LAW 
AND THE POTENTIAL SUBSTITUTION OF BANKRUPTCY 
FOR REVENUE 
This Part provides the background for the Article’s argument. First, it 
gives a brief overview of the history of municipal bankruptcy and 
relevant major provisions of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Second, 
it describes the increasing likelihood that municipal bankruptcy will be 
used to avoid raising sufficient revenue to meet obligations, particularly 
obligations to municipal retirees. 
A. Brief History and Overview of Relevant Municipal Bankruptcy Law 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
48
 governs municipal bankruptcy. 
Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy statute in 1934.
49
 Two 
years later, in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District,
50
 
the Supreme Court ruled the 1934 Act unconstitutional. Congress 
quickly responded with a new statute in 1937.
51
 Commentators have 
noted that differences between the 1934 and 1937 Acts were small,
52
 and 
the 1937 Act was challenged on the same basis as the 1934 Act: it was 
                                                     
Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 
125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1154 (2016) (citing McConnell & Picker, supra note 3); McConnell & Picker, 
supra note 3, at 466 (“[U]nsecured creditors of municipalities are protected from the moral hazard 
problem of opportunistic bankruptcy filings . . . by the best interests of the creditors standard.”). 
47. Omer Kimhi reviews the legislative history of municipal bankruptcy in support of an 
argument that the 1976 Act marked an important change in the purpose of the statute from solving 
the “holdout problem” to providing comprehensive relief to cities on the model of corporate 
bankruptcy. Kimhi does not discuss tax increases as a condition for bankruptcy relief. See Kimhi, 
Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 3, at 362–69. 
48. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012). 
49. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (declared unconstitutional in Ashton v. 
Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936)). 
50. 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
51. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653. 
52. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH[3], at 900-27 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2014), LexisNexis (database updated 2016) (“[M]odest increase in the protection of 
the states’ sovereignty.”). 
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argued that the Act impermissibly gave the federal courts power over 
state affairs. The Court rejected this challenge in 1940 in United States v. 
Bekins.
53
 The change probably reflects a switch in the Court’s attitude 
more than any change in the Act’s content.54 
The 1934 and 1937 Acts were both styled as temporary emergency 
legislation to deal with the Depression and the 1937 Act was set to 
expire in 1940.
55
 Congress extended the life of the Act in 1940
56
 and 
1942,
57
 and made municipal bankruptcy permanent in 1946.
58
 
There were no major changes in municipal bankruptcy law until 1976, 
when Congress enacted a revised bankruptcy statute, the 1976 Act,
59
 
which was intended to be more useful in handling large municipal 
bankruptcies. Given that major revision in 1976, municipal bankruptcy 
received comparatively little attention in the comprehensive 1978 
Bankruptcy Act,
60
 although the 1978 Act did result in municipal 
bankruptcy’s current designation as Chapter 9 of the Code. Congress 
next made significant changes to municipal bankruptcy in 1988; the 
1988 Act
61
 was primarily aimed at preserving the status of revenue 
bonds in municipal bankruptcy.
62
 The last noteworthy revision to the 
municipal bankruptcy statute was in 1994; the 1994 Act
63
 covered a 
large number of miscellaneous bankruptcy topics and resolved a split in 
authority by providing that municipal bankruptcy had to be specifically 
                                                     
53. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). Supreme Court authority on municipal bankruptcy is quite sparse. Apart 
from Ashton and Bekins, the only major case is Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 
316 U.S. 502 (1942), which held that a state statute providing for composition of debts did not 
violate the Contracts Clause. Id. at 512–16. Congress prohibited state composition statutes that 
purport to bind non-consenting creditors in the 1946 Act. Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-481, 
§ 83(i), 60 Stat. 409, 415 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 903(1)–(2) (2012)).  
54. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The “switch in time” is discussed 
in DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR 
331–39 (1999). 
55. Act of Aug. 16, 1927, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 84, 50 Stat. 653, 659. 
56. Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-669, § 84, 54 Stat. 667, 670. 
57. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-622, § 84, 56 Stat. 377, 377. 
58. Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-481, 60 Stat. 409. 
59. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315. 
60. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 262 
(1977) (“The need for substantive revision [of municipal bankruptcy] this year is not great . . . .”). 
61. Act of Nov. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-597, 102 Stat. 3028. 
62. See, e.g., 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 52, ¶ 900.LH[5], at 900-32 to -33 (1988 
Amendments addressed the issue that “the postpetition lien termination provision (section 552) and 
the protection of nonrecourse secured creditors embodied in section 1111(b) . . . had the likely effect 
of converting nonrecourse revenue bonds into unsecured general obligation bonds”). 
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.  
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authorized by the municipality’s state government.64 
Municipal bankruptcy under Chapter 9 differs from other bankruptcy 
proceedings in several ways. There are unique eligibility requirements: 
the debtor must be a municipality,
65
 must be specifically authorized 
under state law to seek bankruptcy protection,
66
 must be insolvent,
67
 and 
must desire to effect a plan of debt adjustment.
68
 The debtor generally 
must negotiate in good faith with its creditors prior to filing unless doing 
so is impracticable.
69
 There is no provision for involuntary municipal 
bankruptcy. 
Once the municipality is in bankruptcy, the Code limits the court’s 
power in ways specific to that context. For example, Article 9 preserves 
the state’s power “to control, by legislation or otherwise, a 
municipality . . . in the exercise of [its] political or governmental 
powers”70 and generally forbids the court, without the debtor’s 
“consent[]”71 from “interfer[ing] with (1) any of the political or 
governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues 
of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use of enjoyment of any income-
producing property.”72 
The Code contemplates that the case will be resolved by a plan of 
adjustment filed by the debtor.
73
 A plan cannot be confirmed unless 
certain requirements are met.
74
 First, the debtor must not be prohibited 
by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan.
75
 Second, 
the debtor must obtain any regulatory or electoral approval necessary 
under non-bankruptcy law to carry out the plan, or the relevant plan 
provisions must be conditioned on receipt of such approval.
76
 Third, the 
                                                     
64. Id. § 402, 108 Stat. at 4141 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012)). 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1). 
66. Id. § 109(c)(2). 
67. Id. § 109(c)(3). 
68. Id. § 109(c)(4). 
69. Id. § 109(c)(5)(B), (C). A debtor may file under Chapter 9 without fulfilling this requirement 
if it has actually obtained the approval of creditors holding a majority in amount of the claims in 
each class that the debtor intends to impair, id. § 109(c)(5)(A), or if the debtor reasonably believes 
that a creditor may seek to obtain an avoidable transfer, id. § 109(c)(5)(D). 
70. Id. § 903. 
71. Id. § 904. 
72. Id. § 904(1)–(3). 
73. Id. § 941. Unlike Chapter 11, Chapter 9 makes no provision for anyone other than the debtor 
to file a bankruptcy plan. 
74. Id. § 943. 
75. Id. § 943(b)(4). 
76. Id. § 943(b)(6).  
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plan must be feasible and in the best interests of creditors.
77
 If the plan is 
to be crammed down (that is, approved over the objection of a class of 
creditors), the plan must, with respect to each class of impaired claims, 
be fair and equitable, and not discriminate unfairly.
78
 
B. The Potential Substitution of Bankruptcy for Revenue 
There is a real and growing possibility that municipalities will start to 
use bankruptcy as an alternative to raising taxes to meet obligations, 
particularly retiree pension and healthcare obligations. 
One reason for this possibility is that municipal debt in general, and 
retiree benefits in particular, is increasingly called “unsustainable.”79 
The term “unsustainable” can mean different things. For example, a 
municipal debt could be called “unsustainable” if it could not be paid out 
of existing tax revenues, even if the debt could be paid with tax 
increases. For some, the category of “unsustainable” debt apparently 
includes all traditional, defined-benefit pension plans,
80
 or even all 
compensation arrangements that result from collective bargaining 
agreements.
81
 Richard Epstein links the asserted unsustainability of 
public employment contracts to their asserted unfairness: 
[I]t is a high moral imperative that someone, somehow, has to 
find a way to undo all the one-sided contracts that national, 
                                                     
77. Id. § 943(b)(7). 
78. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating § 1129(b)(1) by reference); id. § 1129(b)(1) (imposing “fair and 
equitable” and “no unfair discrimination” requirements with respect to impaired classes of claims). 
79. For example, a Westlaw search of Law Reviews & Journals on June 23, 2015, on “pension /s 
unsustainable” turned up 46 results, 35 of them from 2010 or later. A search of articles via Google 
News that discuss both “unsustainable” and “pensions” turns up 41,800 results (Feb. 9, 2016). The 
same search of news sources via Lexis Advance from Jan. 1, 2005, to date came up with over 
35,000 results (with a sharp rise starting in 2008 and a peak at 2011 that has plateaued until today). 
Site searches of leading national think tanks also turned up numerous results: Heritage Foundation 
(165), American Enterprise Institute (334), Brookings Institution (447) and Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (76). 
80. WAYNE H. WINEGARDEN, GOING BROKE ONE CITY AT A TIME: MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES 
IN AMERICA 20–21 (2014) (“Defined Benefit (DB) plans are unwise, unsustainable, and should be 
replaced with Defined Contribution (DC) plans.”). One recent student comment describes defined 
contribution plans in general as a “more sustainable model” than defined benefit plans, and 
discusses “state-authorized local tools” for dealing with pensions for three pages without ever 
mentioning even the theoretical possibility of tax increases. Hannah Heck, Comment, Solving 
Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 89, 113–16, 128 (2011).  
81. Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 50 (2011) (stating without 
qualification that “[t]he collective bargaining agreements between municipalities and public sector 
workers are not sustainable under the current fiscal framework”). 
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state, and local governments have entered into with their 
unionized workforces, which call for a set of unsustainable 
pension and health care obligations. . . . The claim that workers 
have rights to perpetuate these one-sided arrangements ignores 
the intolerable financial burdens that these outsized contracts 
impose on everyone else.
82
 
At the same time that the idea that local retiree benefits are 
unsustainable is gaining ground, bankruptcy is becoming more and more 
established as a way of adjusting municipal debts. Residents might vote 
out elected officials who take a municipality into bankruptcy, but this 
risk to political careers should decrease as bankruptcy becomes more 
acceptable. As Warren Buffett puts it, “the stigma [of municipal 
bankruptcy] has probably been reduced” by recent filings,83 and the 
apparent success of bankruptcy proceedings in Detroit and Stockton can 
only have reduced the stigma still further. Against this backdrop, it is 
natural for those who want to balance budgets without raising taxes to 
look to bankruptcy as a way of accomplishing their goals. Reducing 
debts, even those that the municipality can afford to pay, will be 
attractive to those who would like to continue enjoying amenities 
without tax increases.
84
 Focusing on pension debts in particular will be 
attractive for those who think that defined-benefit pension plans are 
unsustainable or believe that public employee pay packages are 
illegitimate. 
                                                     
82. Richard A. Epstein, The Breakdown of the Social Democratic State: Taking a Fresh Look at 
Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1169, 1173 (2011). 
83. Margaret Collins, Warren Buffett Says Municipal Bankruptcies Set to Climb as Stigma Lifts, 
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-
13/buffett-says-muni-bankruptcies-poised-to-climb-as-stigma-lifts [https://perma.cc/4AFH-GZ8L] 
(referring to fact that “very sizeable cities like Stockton and San Bernardino” have filed for 
bankruptcy protection). Compare the remarks of a commentator in 2007, who described Chapter 9 
as a “venue of last resort” for municipal debtors “in dire financial straits” at the “brink of collapse.” 
Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 295, 322 (2007); id. at 335–36 (“Chapter 9 and its predecessors were specifically enacted to 
provide an extraordinary remedy of last resort for the states and their distressed subdivisions.”). 
84. The prospect of closing swimming pools in the summer apparently was part of the impetus for 
San Jose’s recent effort to increase pension contributions and cut pension cost-of-living increases 
without raising taxes. See Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, Struggling, San Jose Tests a Way 
to Cut Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/struggling-
san-jose-tests-a-way-to-cut-benefits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A93V-DKP2]. A trial court 
rejected this effort on the ground that it interfered with vested rights. Statement of Decision at 17, 
24, San Jose Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of San Jose, No. 1-12-CV-225926 (Santa Clara Cty. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2014). The city appealed the trial court’s decision. Mike Rosenberg, Pension 
Reform: San Jose Appeals Measure B Ruling, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (June 10, 2014, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/pensions/ci_25936713/pension-reform-san-jose-appeals-measure-b-
ruling [https://perma.cc/4SQD-8YEZ].  
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Indeed, scholars already have called for relaxing the insolvency 
requirement for municipal bankruptcy, one of the major statutory 
obstacles to opportunistic filing. David Skeel argues that “a lot of cities 
who might be good candidates for Ch. 9 are going to have trouble 
meeting that insolvency standard” and that “[w]e do not use that 
standard for other bankruptcies.”85 This call to make it easier for cities to 
get into bankruptcy is particularly noteworthy both because of Skeel’s 
prominence as a critic of “unsustainable” debt86 and because he has 
elsewhere recognized that public debt is not unsustainable if taxes can be 
levied to pay it.
87
 This leading commentator seems to be moving toward 
the position that cities should be able to use bankruptcy as a substitute 
for increasing tax revenues. 
The changing status of municipal bankruptcy has not escaped the 
notice of financial professionals. One municipal bond analyst recently 
discussed“taxpayer groups who are looking to get into bankruptcy just to 
shed debt.”88 Although that analyst thought that the Jefferson County 
bankruptcy plan, which included large sewer rate increases, did “take the 
thunder out” of these groups’ claims,89 at least temporarily, no one 
                                                     
85. Steve Eide, “The Best Interests of Creditors”: A Public Sector Inc. Q&A with David Skeel on 
What’s Next for Detroit, PUB. SECTOR, INC. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.publicsectorinc.org/ 
interviews/the-best-interests-of-creditors-a-public-sector-inc-qa-with-david-skeel-on-whats-next-
for-detroit/ [https://perma.cc/T9HZ-J455]. 
86. See Skeel, Jr., supra note 15, at 8 (“[I]t is difficult or impossible to restructure accrued 
obligations outside of bankruptcy under Michigan law, even if they appear to be unsustainable.”); 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
1063, 1084 (2013) (“[A] major piece of the puzzle for many of the most troubled municipalities and 
states is unsustainable pension promises.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an 
Option (for People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2231–33 (2014) (arguing 
that one factor relevant to whether bankruptcy relief should be available in general is whether 
“unsustainable debt” is a problem in a given situation). 
87. David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 688 (2012) (arguing that 
“thanks to taxes and other revenues, [states] may be able to handle debt burdens that initially appear 
to be oppressive”). In the same vein, see Skeel, Jr., supra note 15, at 13 (in analyzing pension 
restructuring in bankruptcy under the Takings Clause, “the pertinent question is what an investor’s 
expectations would be for an underfunded pension in a time of financial crisis, not expectations in 
ordinary times” (emphasis added)); id. at 15 (“So long as only financially stressed municipalities are 
permitted to file for bankruptcy, the best interests protection minimizes any interference with the 
Contracts Clause”); id. at 23 (argument that best-interests clause prohibits restructuring of Detroit 
pensions “is flawed, because it assumes that Detroit could plausibly come up with the money to pay 
its pensions in full. It is more likely that Detroit would have simply stop[ped] paying its pensions at 
some point. Given this possibility, the best interests test will not be interpreted as prohibiting any 
restructuring of pensions”). 
88. Martin Z. Braun, Jefferson County’s Bankruptcy Left Few Winners, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 
2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-22/jefferson-county-s-
bankruptcy-left-few-winners-as-debt-forgiven [https://perma.cc/ST9N-E8XR]. 
89. Id. 
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decision can put to rest the debate over municipal taxes and debt, 
including pensions. 
Some commentators, including Professor Kevin Kordana, have 
asserted that financial markets will discipline municipalities, so that 
opportunistic filings are not a risk.
90
 But a bankruptcy targeted at 
workers would not necessarily harm financial creditors—for example, 
certain obligations, such as revenue bonds, could be paid through the 
bankruptcy. Or a municipality might not have any, or much, capital-
market debt. Or its pension obligations might dwarf its capital-market 
debt, so that the cost of capital-market discipline would be small relative 
to the benefit of relief from pension obligations. Moreover, capital 
markets may not provide much discipline anyway: credit rating agencies 
have well-known problems,
91
 and diversification and hedging can blunt 
the incentives for fine-grained monitoring.
92
 
II. TAXES AND MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code does not in so many words address 
any obligation municipalities may have to raise taxes as a condition of 
bankruptcy relief. However, as discussed in more detail below, at least 
four provisions of the Code arguably bear on the matter.
93
 The 
legislative history of municipal bankruptcy sheds light on the ambiguous 
statutory text.
94
 The Article addresses the legislative history first to put 
the somewhat abstract statutory terms in context. 
The legislative history of the municipal bankruptcy statutes, starting 
                                                     
90. See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 
1071–89 (1997) (arguing by analogy to sovereign debt that the need to return to the capital markets 
is likely to prevent municipalities from opportunistically defaulting); David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 
of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis?, 24 URB. LAW. 539, 
586 (1992) (“It is clear that a municipality filing . . . under Chapter 9 would take such a decision 
extremely seriously and would be very concerned about the municipality’s future standing in the 
credit markets. Frivolous filings are not the danger.”). 
91. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The 
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 109, 129–55 (describing perceived problems in rating-agency market). 
92. See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and 
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 662 (2009) (arguing that diversification and hedging are 
substitutes for monitoring from investors’ perspective). 
93. See discussion infra Part 0 
94. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 48:13, at 616 (7th rev. ed. 2014) (“[T]oday courts generally do admit statements made by 
individual legislators during debate to help interpret ambiguous statutes.”). 
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with the 1934 Act,
95
 makes clear that Congress had an abiding concern 
with making sure that municipalities paid creditors all they were 
reasonably able to pay. The legislative record also suggests that the 
concept of “ability to pay” included ability to pay through raising taxes. 
Finally, although the first municipal bankruptcy law took shape before 
the current era of direct democracy in local taxation, the record suggests 
that Congress was concerned about opportunism on the part of local 
populations, so that the voters’ failure to approve a tax increase would 
be cause for denying relief in Chapter 9. The statutes enacted in the 
“modern” era of municipal bankruptcy, 1976 and beyond, did not depart 
from the original understanding. Indeed, the legislative history of the 
1976, 1978, and 1988 Acts expressly called upon municipalities to 
exercise their taxing power to the fullest extent to meet their obligations 
and affirmed judicial precedents under the older statutes that imposed a 
similar obligation. 
A. “Maximum Capacity to Pay”: The 1934, 1937, and 1946 Acts 
The first three municipal bankruptcy statutes reflect a continuing 
concern that municipalities would unjustifiably walk away from their 
                                                     
95. Even though the Supreme Court found the 1934 Act unconstitutional, the Act’s legislative 
history is relevant to the interpretation of current law. As one treatise explains it, courts look to 
“prior statutes on the same subject” as a form of interpretation “in pari materia,” often assuming the 
legislature “must have resorted to the same means to arrive at its purpose.” 2A SINGER & SINGER, 
supra note 94, § 48:3, at 568–73. In particular, the 1937 Act in effect reenacted the 1934 Act, 
incorporating a few changes to make clear that the Act did not intrude on state sovereignty, such as 
excluding counties from eligibility. Compare Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 
Stat. 798 (declared unconstitutional in Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 
513, 532 (1936)) (“[a]ny municipality or other political subdivision of any state” is covered), with 
Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 81, 50 Stat. 653 (listing types of eligible “taxing 
agencies or instrumentalities” and not including counties). See also The Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
Revision of the Salary Fixing Procedure for Bankruptcy Judges, Adjustment of Debts of Political 
Subdivision and Public Agencies and Instrumentalities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 210–11 (1975) 
[hereinafter 1975 Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. Scalia) (comparing 
Ashton, which held 1934 Act unconstitutional, and Bekins, which held 1937 Act constitutional, and 
stating, that the “two cases . . . on their facts, do not seem particularly distinguishable”); 6 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 52, ¶ 900.LH[3], at 900-28 (“The primary differences between 
Chapter IX [the 1934 Act] and Chapter X [the 1937 Act] were a change in the number of consents 
needed for confirmation of a plan . . . and a modest increase in the protection of the states’ 
sovereignty.”); KENNETH N. KLEE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 4 (2012), 
https://cumberland.samford.edu/files/Short%20History%20of%20Municipal%20Bankruptcy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TAZ-KJ6E] (the 1937 Act “was similar to Chapter IX [the 1934 Act], but leaned 
slightly more in favor of states’ rights”). The 1937 Act contained the same language relating to 
insolvency as the 1934 Act. Compare Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(a) (“[I]nsolvent or unable to meet 
its debts as they mature.”), with Act of May 24, 1934, § 80(a) (same). 
07 - Hunt.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
532 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:515 
 
debts and a corresponding intention to require that municipalities 
exhaust their “maximum capacity to pay” before invoking the federal 
bankruptcy power to reduce their debts. 
1. The 1934 Act 
Throughout the debate on the 1934 Act, members of Congress called 
on municipalities to pay all they could toward their debts in bankruptcy. 
As Senator Matthew Neely of West Virginia argued in opening the 
Senate floor debate on the bill,
96
 the Depression made it “impossible” for 
many cities to meet obligations
97
 because they were “ground by the 
upper millstone of increasing demands for revenue and the nether 
millstone of decreasing ability to collect taxes.”98 The result, he argued, 
was that “taxing districts [could not] possibly pay their debts according 
to the letter of the contracts which attest them.”99 
In light of the Depression, supporters of the Act argued, it was 
necessary to subordinate debt service to payment for other public 
services “in order to preserve the communal unit from disintegration.”100 
Under the circumstances of the Great Depression, proponents of 
municipal bankruptcy argued that their colleagues faced a choice 
between “orderly refunding” and “chaotic defaults” with no middle 
way.
101
 Municipal bankruptcy was portrayed as being not for cities that 
had decided their promises were unaffordable or undesirable, but instead 
for cities that were on the brink of collapse. 
As Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, a principal supporter of 
the bill, rather lyrically expressed it, the bankruptcy power was to be 
                                                     
96. Statements made in floor debates are relevant to interpreting the Act. Although courts once 
did not look to statements of individual legislators for help in interpreting statutes, “the traditional 
view has been modified, and today courts generally do admit statements made by individual 
legislators during debate to help interpret ambiguous statutes.” 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 
94, § 48:13, at 613–17. Such statements vary in probative value; statements by a bill’s sponsor, by 
the “standing committee member charged to present the bill and lead debate,” and statements that 
“show a common agreement in the legislature about the meaning of an ambiguous provision,” are 
entitled to greater weight. Id. § 48:13, at 618–19. 
97. 78 CONG. REC. 7630, 7641 (1934) (statement of Sen. Neely) (emphasis added); id. at 7642 
(“impossible terms” of municipal indebtedness). 
98. Id. at 7642 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. at 7642 (emphasis added). 
100. Id. at 7650 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg); see also id. (noting that bondholders would be 
harmed by “complete disintegration of the social and communal life in the community,” and giving 
Detroit as an example, where expenses were cut by forty percent from 1931–1934, in part by 
discharging 10,000 city employees and “reduc[ing]” the city government “to a survival basis and the 
employees to a welfare-existence wage”).  
101. Id. at 7649. 
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used to relieve cities on the limited basis that their debts exceeded their 
maximum “capacity” to pay: 
The bill only asks that these groups and units of our fellow 
citizens shall have an orderly opportunity to survive the 
concluding phases of this depression, to husband their tax 
resources against the better day when they may pay their debts 
in full, to preserve their honor, their credit, and their self-respect, 
and to protect the rights of those to whom they are indebted, and 
to whom they intend to pay their debts on the basis of maximum 
capacity to pay.
102
 
The language of “capacity” came up again when the inevitable 
question about fairness to creditors arose. Senator Charles Hastings of 
Delaware asked “whether this is for the relief of the taxpayer, taking it 
from the bondholder,”103 and Senator Vandenberg replied, “the failure in 
Michigan cities . . . to produce an adequate revenue to maintain the full 
debt service is in no degree due to any unwillingness on the part of the 
taxpayer to pay and pay and pay to the limit of his capacity.”104 As 
Vandenberg explained, the bill was in the same spirit as the Canadian 
system, in which a commission determined the “capacity of the 
municipality to pay its debts.”105 
The debates also seem to assume that taxpayers had obligations 
respecting municipal debts and to reflect a concern that the bankruptcy 
power not be used to relieve taxpayers from doing their part to meet 
municipal obligations. The “decreasing ability to collect taxes” 
referenced in the debate apparently was not a mere political inability to 
pass taxes, but instead an economic inability to generate revenue.
106
 
These debates, which took place long before California’s Proposition 13 
inaugurated an era of local tax revolt,
107
 cast doubt on whether the 
federal bankruptcy power is available to aid a municipality where the 
taxpayers have disabled local government from raising taxes to pay 
debts. 
                                                     
102. Id. at 7650 (emphasis added). 
103. Id. at 7652 (statement of Sen. Hastings). 
104. Id. at 7652 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg) (emphasis added). 
105. Id. at 7654. 
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
107. See David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing 
Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 203 (2015) (“Though far from the first tax 
revolt in United States history, the passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 was a watershed 
moment for contemporary opposition to taxation.”). Proposition 13 limits property taxes on homes 
to one percent of the full cash value of the home. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1 (adopted June 6, 
1978). 
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For example, opponents of the statute emphasized the possible 
negative effects of a municipal bankruptcy statute on the municipal bond 
market.
108
 They also argued that municipal bankruptcy would cause 
municipalities to make the politically expedient decision to seek 
bankruptcy protection rather than raise taxes.
109
 These arguments were 
met with the reply that “[t]he people are not able to pay the taxes.”110 
Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida explained: 
The people cannot escape their obligations. They have no desire 
to repudiate them. There is no inclination to escape the payment 
of their debts while they are able to pay them and where it is 
possible for them to pay. They are taxed, however, almost to the 
limit. In many instances resort has been made to the courts. Any 
bondholder can go into court and bring suit, where his obligation 
is in default, and obtain a mandamus to compel the authorities of 
the municipality, for instance, to levy an assessment. The 
authorities make the levy. The taxpayers cannot pay the tax.
111
 
Members of Congress argued that bankruptcy relief was needed in 
cities like Pontiac, Michigan, where “[a]s a result of tremendous tax 
delinquencies” it was “absolutely impossible to maintain . . . debt 
service” and provide essential services.112 In response, a pre-Laffer 
equivalent of the Laffer Curve appeared; cities for which bankruptcy 
relief is appropriate were those that have passed the point where tax 
                                                     
108. The opponents argued that “it is the duty of the State to come to the relief” of distressed 
communities “rather than to involve the faith and credit of the tens of thousands of solvent 
municipalities throughout the entire country.” S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 5 (1934) (statement of 
minority views); see also 78 CONG. REC. 7656 (statement of Sen. Van Nuys) (Florida municipal 
insolvencies are “a matter for State relief”). 
109. See 78 CONG. REC. 7661 (statement of Sen. Hastings) (asserting that the leaders of a 
hypothetical town that had borrowed excessively before the depression would “inevitabl[y]” choose 
to seek bankruptcy protection rather than collecting taxes and that “we are going to see the 2,019 
[defaulting municipalities] mount rapidly to 10 times that”); id. at 7663 (“[I]f it were not for the fact 
that it would result in encouraging cities in the future to disregard their obligations . . . I should be 
willing to forego my objection to it . . . .”); id. (arguing that in distressed cities such as New York, 
tax increase opponents would argue for seeking bankruptcy protection). Opponents also argued that 
states could impose moratoriums on debt payments as another way of getting a breathing space. See 
id.; id. at 7662 (noting that states could “provide by law that . . . municipalities might declare a 
moratorium for a certain period, and make it perfectly legal”). Proponents replied that a single 
uniform federal system was better than forty eight different state systems. Id. (statement of Sen. 
Vandenberg). 
110. Id. at 7663 (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (emphasis added); see also id. at 7739 (statement of 
Sen. Fletcher) (“[T]he people cannot pay the taxes.”); id. at 7740 (“[P]eople cannot pay taxes on the 
basis of the old value.”). 
111. Id. at 7739 (emphasis added). 
112. Id. at 7651 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). Vandenberg stated that the city continued to 
provide essential services, “although on greatly reduced bases.” Id. 
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increases can generate more revenue.
113
 
The legislative history also reveals that bankruptcy was intended to 
benefit, not harm, creditors as a group, despite a background 
assumption
114
 that creditors could compel municipalities to raise taxes 
outside bankruptcy via mandamus actions, including in federal court.
115
 
As one supporter argued on the floor of Congress, “there is no existing 
law under which proceedings of this nature [mandamus actions] can be 
prevented.”116 Supporters of the bill argued that the prospect of its 
passage had increased municipal bond values
117
 and that its passage 
would benefit bondholders still further,
118
 despite the creditors’ access to 
the mandamus remedy. Bankruptcy, then, was intended as a win-win 
proposition that benefited both debtors as a class and creditors as a class 
by defeating holdouts who otherwise would obstruct a majority-
                                                     
113. The “Laffer curve,” named after President Ronald Reagan’s economic advisor Arthur Laffer, 
is a popular term for the idea that tax rates above some level will actually raise less revenue for 
government than lower tax rates. Although Laffer’s name may be the one most commonly 
associated with the concept, the notion goes back at least as far as Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 308–09 (1776). Laffer himself attributes a similar idea to the fourteenth-
century philosopher Ibn Khaldun. ARTHUR LAFFER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE LAFFER CURVE: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1–2 (2004), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/the-
laffer-curve-past-present-and-future [https://perma.cc/ZK57-6752]. Journalist and consultant Jude 
Wanniski helped popularize the term “Laffer Curve.” See Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the 
‘Laffer Curve,’ 50 PUB. INT. 3 (1978), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080528_ 
197805001taxesrevenuesandthelaffercurvejudewanniski.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9Z3-EYXH]. 
114. Legislators’ background assumptions about the law are relevant to interpreting a statute: the 
“relevant history . . . may include information about . . . contemporary economic conditions, 
prevailing business practices, and the prior state of the law, including judicial decisions.” 2A 
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 95, § 48:4, at 575–77. Such information is relevant if it is “widely 
available and generally relied upon by the legislators,” id. at 577, that is, reasonably understood as 
part of legislators’ background assumptions. 
115. S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 2 (1934) (“These defaulting taxing districts may now be sued by 
nonresidents in Federal courts as a private person may be sued for debt, and by mandamus may be 
compelled to levy the necessary tax to meet past due obligations, and their officers may be sent to 
jail for contempt if they refuse to proceed to the levy and collection of the necessary taxes.”); id. at 
4 (municipal bankruptcy bill “proposes to discharge the municipality and its officers from the duty 
imposed by State law to levy taxes to pay the debts and obligations of the municipality”) (statement 
of minority views); 78 CONG. REC. 7642 (statement of Sen. Neely) (stating that “[i]n many cases” 
bondholders’ mandamus proceedings “increase the burdens and add to the embarrassment of the 
defaulting taxing districts”); id. at 7662 (statement of Sen. King) (recalling that courts had cited 
local officials for contempt for failing to levy taxes to pay municipal debt); id. at 7739 (statement of 
Sen. Fletcher) (“The Federal courts already have jurisdiction to issue orders compelling the 
assessment of taxes.”). 
116. 78 CONG. REC. 7642 (statement of Sen. Neely). 
117. Id. at 7654 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg). 
118. Id. at 7652; id. at 7654–55 (citing support for bill by insurance companies that held large 
portfolios of municipal bonds). 
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approved composition plan.
119
 Congress intended to protect all important 
classes of creditors; the only losers were to be holdouts who sought to 
extract more than their fair share from the composition.
120
 
2. The 1937 Act 
As noted, the 1937 Act made few substantive changes to the 1934 
Act, and the debate over the 1937 Act largely reprised the discussion of 
its predecessor: The bill’s opponents argued that Congress should not aid 
municipalities in evading their moral obligations,
121
 and the bill’s 
supporters answered that the bankruptcy bill aided creditors as a group, 
not just debtor municipalities and their citizens. In particular, the 
creditors’ remedy outside bankruptcy, a writ of mandamus requiring a 
tax increase, was ineffective because taxpayers could not or would not 
pay increased taxes. 
For example, the House of Representatives report recognized that 
creditors of an insolvent municipality could not foreclose, but “must 
look to the exercise of the taxing power over a period of years,”122 and 
that without intervention of the federal bankruptcy power, the creditors 
“must resort to mandamus proceedings.”123 The report further argued 
that mandamus proceedings “have not been adequate remedies,” 
apparently because “the trend of recent decision has been to deny the 
                                                     
119. See Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798 (requiring that petition 
for bankruptcy relief be accompanied by a plan of readjustment accepted by fifty-one of the 
creditors by value of the taxing district (thirty percent for drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and 
levee districts)). 
120. The 1976 Act, with its addition of a “cramdown” provision that permits confirmation of 
plans that are opposed by a majority of creditors, arguably worked a major change in the purpose of 
municipal bankruptcy and expanded its purposes far beyond solving the holdout problem. See 
Kimhi, Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 3, at 366–69. If so, the particular rationale 
presented in this paragraph might not support considering tax levels in municipal bankruptcy. 
However, this Article demonstrates that neither the 1976 Act nor its successors deviated from the 
proposition that tax levels are relevant. See infra Section II.B. 
121. 81 CONG. REC. 6312 (1937) (statement of Rep. Snell); see also id. at 6319 (statement of 
Rep. Michener) (stating that investors “relied entirely upon the honesty of the cities and 
municipalities and the ability of those municipalities to levy taxes to meet the indebtedness . . . . I 
am opposed to the Federal Government or any other unit of government repudiating its 
obligations”); id. at 6319 (statement of Rep. Robison) (“I think it is wrong in principle for a 
government, State, or subdivision of a State to repudiate an honest debt.”); id. at 6320 (statement of 
Rep. Rees) (“What you are saying is that towns . . . throughout the United States may from now on, 
if they choose to do so . . . go into court and repudiate their obligations.”); id. at 6323 (statement of 
Rep. Creal) (“Up until this time the idea of a political unit . . . repudiating a debt has been absolutely 
foreign to the lay mind in America . . . I want to be in the Record as in opposition to it.”). 
122. H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3 (1937); see also S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 2 (1937). 
123. H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3; see also S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 2. 
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writ of mandamus wherever sound judicial discretion justifies denial.”124 
Thus, “creditors have been unable to obtain unjust advantage, but the 
problem of the municipality or taxing district has remained unsolved,” 
so that the bankruptcy bill “remove[s] an apparent impasse.”125 
Similar points came up in the floor debate on the bill. When 
Representative Bertrand Snell of New York argued that the bankruptcy 
bill would permit municipalities where “[t]he moral responsibility of the 
community is not very strong” to “repudiate and beat the honest holders 
of . . . securities out of their money,” the answer, delivered by William 
Driver of Arkansas, was that composition benefited creditors because 
“[t]he taxpayers of the district find themselves unable to meet that great 
amount of debt.”126 The key selling point was that creditors are aided 
when a composition “bring[s] the total of amounts payable within the 
ability of the debtor to pay.”127 Notably, the focus was on the taxpayers’ 
ability to pay, that is, whether additional taxes would in fact raise 
revenue. 
Representative Hatton Sumners, Democrat of Texas, responded to 
Snell’s objection in similar terms, using “the ability of the municipality 
to collect taxes” as the yardstick.128 
                                                     
124. H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3; see also S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 2–3. Representative Wilcox of 
Florida, one of the bill’s major proponents and the author of the 1934 legislation, argued that “the 
court has no discretion” in granting mandamus to support bondholders’ actions, so holdout 
bondholders had too much leverage in resisting, and therefore undoing, compositions. 81 CONG. 
REC. 6316. 
125. H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3; see also S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 2–3. 
126. 81 CONG. REC. 6312 (statement of Rep. Driver). 
127. Id. at 6313 (statement of Rep. Sumners) (emphasis added); see also id. (“Whatever may be 
the theory with regard to the ability of creditors to force these municipalities to pay, it does not 
work . . . . There is no effective government agency that can compel a municipality to pay its 
bonds.”). Representative Wilcox observed that the mandamus remedy was “entirely impractical” 
because “[a] tax levy can be put on, but nobody as yet has devised a means of reaching down into 
the pockets of the taxpayers and making them pay a tax which they think is inequitable and unfair.” 
Id. Wilcox appears to be discussing tax burdens that are not just unfair, but also uneconomic:  
Of course, you can sell his property under a tax execution or under some other means of 
foreclosing the tax; but, after all, the man who buys the property at the tax sale buys it subject 
to the whole debt again, and he, in turn, can lose it next year on the same thing. 
Id.  
128. The full exchange reads as follows: 
Mr. Snell. I do not want to pass any legislation that will make it easier for some of these 
communities which do not fully appreciate the moral responsibility which rests upon that 
community to repudiate some of their debts . . . .  
Mr. Sumners of Texas. Finally, you reach a situation in the case of some of these 
municipalities where the bonded indebtedness is greater than the ability of the municipality to 
collect taxes to retire the indebtedness. I think this is absolutely true with reference to many of 
these municipalities. This legislation, as we see it, is in favor of the people who own these 
bonds . . . . 
Mr. Snell. We know that in some of these communities there are always some people saying 
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Other representatives were even more direct in expressing that 
municipalities were supposed to impose taxes to pay debts, at least up to 
the practical limits of the ability to collect. Representative Sam Hobbs, 
Democrat of Alabama, indicated that the bankrupt municipality’s taxing 
power would be subject “wholly and unreservedly” to the bankruptcy 
court, which would be bound to “safeguard to the uttermost the ‘interests 
of the creditors.’”129 At the same time, Hobbs expressed the idea of the 
Laffer Curve some forty years before Wanniski popularized the term. 
Hobbs recognized that the bankruptcy court’s ability to protect creditors 
was limited by the fact that “the power to tax . . . frequently cannot 
collect.”130 More colorfully, Hobbs explained that “by taxation which is 
unreasonably high you can . . . kill a goose which, while not laying, 
might, under revised conditions, resume that happy function.”131 
Just as in the debate over the 1934 Act, supporters argued that the 
standard for invoking bankruptcy protection was high. Senator William 
Dieterich of Illinois reaffirmed that municipalities were expected to pay 
“as much as they can pay without destroying the taxing body or the 
municipality.”132 
                                                     
that they are not going to pay their taxes, that they will let the situation go along so far that the 
tax receipts are not sufficient to meet the obligations and in that way force a compromise with 
their creditors. I am opposed to that proposition. 
Mr. Sumners: I am sorry if the gentleman does not agree. I have done the best I can to explain 
the object and plan of the bill.  
81 CONG. REC. 6313–14 (emphasis added); see also id. at 6315 (statement of Rep. Snell) 
(presenting the same argument). 
129. Id. at 6321 (statement of Rep. Hobbs).  
130. Id. 
131. Id. (“The truth of the old adage ‘You cannot get blood from a turnip,’ was never better 
illustrated than by those within the six classes of petitioners described in this bill. All they have is 
their taxing power. Seldom, if ever — and then only after foreclosure — have they any property. All 
they can bring into court is their taxing power. This they do and subject it and themselves wholly 
and unreservedly to the jurisdiction and sound discretion of a court of equity. That court is bound by 
the terms of the bill to safeguard to the uttermost the ‘interests of the creditors.’ The power to tax 
has been held to be the power to destroy . . . . But the power to tax, while it may destroy, frequently 
cannot collect. You may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, and by taxation which is 
unreasonably high you can also kill a goose which, while not laying, might, under revised 
conditions, resume that happy function.”). 
132. Id. at. 8544 (statement of Sen. Dieterich); id. at 8545–46 (statement of Sen. Pepper) (special 
districts seeking bankruptcy protection may not have property to surrender, but “[t]hey must 
surrender all they have. In the case of municipalities . . . it is in the discretion of the Federal 
court . . . to make full investigation and to determine whether or not the petitioning debtor has made 
a full and fair disclosure of its ability to pay”). Dieterich was responding to concerns about 
municipal opportunism that were phrased in very similar terms to those Representative Snell used. 
See id. at 8544 (statement of Sen. King) (arguing that if bankruptcy bill passed, “there will not be an 
invitation for [eligible] municipalities to exercise the taxing power which they have or to resort to 
other measures for defending the prestige and honor and credit of the municipality” but would seek 
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Although the idea that municipalities and their taxpayers should pay 
as much as possible toward their debts was often invoked as a general 
background principle of the bill, it also came up in connection with 
specific provisions. The bill’s supporters stressed that the insolvency 
requirement—the requirement that the municipality be unable to meet 
obligations before seeking bankruptcy relief—was part of the solution to 
the problem of opportunistic bankruptcy. Shortly after the exchange 
quoted above, Sumners explained that as a prerequisite of relief, “[t]he 
court must first ascertain that [the petitioning municipality is] in a 
condition where [it] cannot pay [its] indebtedness.”133 Representative J. 
Mark Wilcox of Florida likewise answered the concern about debt 
repudiation by “call[ing] attention” to the provision providing that “[t]he 
Federal judge to whom this petition for confirmation must be submitted 
must find, first of all, that the taxing district is insolvent or unable to 
meet its debts as they mature.”134 
The requirement that the composition be in the “best interests of the 
creditors”135 also reflects the view that municipalities should pay all they 
can toward their debts. Representative Wilcox explained that test as 
follows: 
[T]he judge is charged with the responsibility of seeing to it that 
the creditor is protected. Not only that it is a fair settlement, not 
only that it is just and equitable, not only that it represents the 
full capacity of the community to pay, but he must find that it is 
in the interest of the creditor — not that the municipality has not 
put over something on the creditor, but that it is in the interest of 
the creditor; and then it goes further and puts this responsibility 
on the judge, and this protects the unrepresented creditor from 
the represented creditor before the court.
136
 
3. The 1946 Act 
The next significant legislative discussion of municipal bankruptcy 
came in 1946, when Congress made the municipal bankruptcy chapter 
permanent.
137
 Again, appropriate use of municipal bankruptcy was 
                                                     
bankruptcy protection instead); id. at 546 (same).  
133. Id. at 6314. 
134. Id. 6323 (statement of Rep. Wilcox). Wilcox continued, “The court must find that as a 
matter of fact and a matter of law. He must find that the taxing district cannot meet its debt before 
the court can entertain jurisdiction of this petition at all.” Id. 
135. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 83(e)(1), 50 Stat. 653, 658. 
136. 81 CONG. REC. 6317 (statement of Rep. Wilcox) (emphasis added). 
137. Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-481, 60 Stat. 409. 
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reduction of debts to what a municipality reasonably could pay. As one 
experienced bond lawyer told the House Judiciary Committee, “I have 
seen the proceedings of more than 100 cases, possibly 150, in which the 
various drainage and irrigation districts reduced the indebtedness to 
where they could pay, and I have never yet seen an abuse by this act or 
under this act.”138 
B. “To the Fullest Extent Possible”: The 1976, 1978, and 1988 Acts 
Although the 1976 Act marked a comprehensive change in municipal 
bankruptcy, aimed at making the procedure useful to larger cities,
139
 
there was no change in congressional intention that municipalities try to 
pay their debts, including trying to pay through raising revenue. If 
anything, the language calling for use of the taxing power became even 
more explicit in the period that started with the 1976 Act; moreover, 
Congress expressly directed courts to take guidance from cases under the 
previously existing statutes that required tax increases. 
1. The 1976 Act 
Although the 1976 Act comprehensively revised municipal 
bankruptcy, the legislative history seems to have little to say about taxes 
specifically. But what it does have to say is emphatic. The House report 
on the 1976 Act expressly states that “[t]he petitioner must exercise its 
taxing power to the fullest extent possible for the benefit of its 
creditors.”140 The report supports its proposition by citing Kelley v. 
Everglades Drainage District
141
 and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation 
District,
142
 leading cases for the proposition that municipalities must, in 
appropriate situations, meet debt obligations using tax revenues.
143
 
                                                     
138. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Bankruptcy & Reorganization of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1946) (statement of J. Bowers Campbell, Municipal 
Section of the American Bar Association, Reconstruction Finance Corporation).  
139. See Kimhi, Solution in Search of a Problem, supra note 3, at 366–69. 
140. H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 33 (1975) (citing Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 144 
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940)); see also id. at 32–33 (stating that plan feasibility is to be determined 
based on likelihood of tax collection (citing Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 
(1943))). The Report also states that the “fair and equitable” test “incorporates the absolute priority 
rule . . . which requires that senior creditors be paid in full before any creditor junior to them may be 
paid at all. The court determines these priorities based on State law.” Id. This statement appears 
relevant to state efforts to give priority to pension claims, a subject generally beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
141. 319 U.S. 415 (1943). 
142. 144 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940). 
143. See infra Section III.C. 
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Kelley and Fano were also endorsed by then-Assistant Attorney 
General Antonin Scalia, who testified in support of the Ford 
Administration’s proposal for a new bankruptcy statute limited to “major 
municipalities,” such as New York City.144 Scalia cited Kelley in arguing 
that the valuation of creditors’ claims “would require a considered 
estimate based on a proper factual foundation of the estimated revenues 
of the municipality.”145 The “estimated revenues” were to include not 
just what that the municipality would bring in without adjusting course, 
but also money that the municipality could lay its hands on by taking 
unusual measures: in determining the estimated revenues, 
“[c]onsideration would . . . have to be given to non-income producing 
assets of the municipality which could appropriately be made to yield 
income or which, if currently not used, could be sold.”146 Although the 
Ford Administration’s proposal was not adopted, Scalia’s statement 
indicates that the administration accepted that municipal bankruptcy 
relief required the city to go outside the normal course of business to 
acquire funds. 
2. The 1978 Act 
Kelley and Fano reappeared in the legislative history of the 1978 Act, 
this time in connection with the “best interests of the creditors” test, 
which the 1978 Act reintroduced as a separate requirement for cram 
down plan confirmation in municipal bankruptcy, distinct from the “fair 
and equitable” test.147 
The 1978 Act was a comprehensive reform of bankruptcy law that 
touched on many subjects other than municipal bankruptcy, and its 
sponsors discussed taxes as part of their explanation of how the various 
parts of the Act fit together. At the same time that the 1978 Act revived 
the term “best interests” for municipal bankruptcy,148 it adopted a more 
precise version of the test for use in corporate reorganizations, requiring 
that a corporate reorganization plan provide each creditor with as much 
                                                     
144. 1975 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 95, at 197–228 (testimony of Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Scalia). 
145. Id. at 204. 
146. Id. 
147. The Senate bill, S. 2266, would not have revived the “best interests” requirement and would 
have required only that the plan be fair and equitable and feasible. S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 101 (1978) 
(provision that was to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 946(b)(1) (2012)).  
148. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 400 (1977) (explaining that “best interest” test had previously 
been deleted from municipal bankruptcy statute because it was “redundant with the fair and 
equitable rule” but was being restored as a separate test in the 1978 Act). 
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value as that creditor would have received in a liquidation of the 
debtor.
149
 Supporters of the Act distinguished between municipal and 
corporate bankruptcy by arguing that liquidation value did not make 
sense as a benchmark in municipal bankruptcy.
150
 In elaborating on what 
“best interests” did mean in municipal bankruptcy, the House and Senate 
sponsors of the 1978 Act explained: 
The best interest of creditors test does not mean liquidation 
value as under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. In making 
such a determination, it is expected that the court will be guided 
by standards set forth in Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 
319 U.S. 415 (1943), and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation 
Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940), as under present law, the 
bankruptcy court should make findings as detailed as possible to 
support a conclusion that this test has been met.
151
 
The Senate version of the 1978 Act, which would have left “best 
interests” as part of the “fair and equitable” requirement, explained: 
Creditors must be provided, under the plan, the going concern 
value of their claims. The going concern value contemplates a 
‘comparison of revenues and expenditures taking into account 
the taxing power and the extent to which tax increases are both 
necessary and feasible’ and is intended to provide more of a 
return to creditors than the liquidation value if the city’s assets 
could be liquidated like those of a private corporation.
152
 
Edwards’ and DeConcini’s statement about the importance of Kelley 
and Fano has not escaped the attention of other scholars.
153
 Their 
                                                     
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 400; 7 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5252, ¶ 1129.02[7], at 1129-33 (referring to 1129(a)(7) as the “best 
interests of creditors” test). 
150. The House Judiciary Committee report on H.R. 8200 observed that in the context of a 
corporate reorganization, the requirement “is phrased in terms of the liquidation of the debtor” and 
noted that “[b]ecause that is not possible in a municipal case, the test here is phrased in its more 
traditional form, using the words of art ‘best interests of creditors.’ The best interest of creditors test 
here is in addition to the financial standards imposed on the plan” under the provisions of Section 
1129 that are incorporated by reference. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 400. 
151. 124 CONG. REC. 11100 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 17417 (statement of Sen. 
DeConcini). 
152. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 113 (1978) (quoting Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: 
Chapter IX, Old and New; Chapter IX Rules¸ 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 64 (1976)). Although 
Congress adopted the House version of the bill and reestablished the “best interests” test as a 
requirement separate from “fair and equitable,” there is no indication that the chambers differed in 
their understanding of what best interests required. 
153. See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 465 n.178 (quoting Rep. Edwards’ 
statement); Kordana, supra note 90, at 1060–61 (same). 
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explanation takes on even greater significance than may have been 
previously appreciated, however, when evaluated in context. Just three 
years before, the 1976 Act committee report had indicated that Kelley 
and Fano stood for the proposition that municipality was to exercise its 
taxing power “to the fullest extent possible” for the benefit of 
creditors.
154
 Moreover, as demonstrated, the sponsors’ reference to the 
cases is part of a history of insistence on taxes as part of the price of 
municipal bankruptcy relief that goes back to the 1930s, and is in 
agreement with a Senate bill that provided a similar standard. 
3. The 1988 Act 
The most important aspect of the 1988 Act for this Article
155
 is its 
adoption of the special definition
156
 of insolvency for the bankrupt 
municipality: “generally not paying its [undisputed] debts as they 
become due”157 or “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”158 
                                                     
154. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 33 (1975) (citing Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 144 
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940)); see also id. at 32–33 (citing Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 
U.S. 415 (1943)). 
155. The key provisions of the 1988 amendments were intended to remove doubts about the 
secured status of revenue bonds in bankruptcy. The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 
500, 542–45 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hearings]; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY 
CONFERENCE ON PROPOSED MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS 535, 535 (1989) [hereinafter 
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE REPORT] (describing this purpose of the proposed legislation); 133 
CONG. REC. 16228–29 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (same). 
156. Congress recognized that the ordinary definition of insolvency, comparing nonexempt assets 
to liabilities, “does not work when applied to a municipality because . . . most of the assets of a 
municipality are not subject to creditors’ claims in the first place.” See 1988 Hearings, supra note 
155, at 533 (statement of Lawrence P. King, Professor, New York University School of Law); id. at 
546; Report of the National Bankruptcy Conference on Proposed Municipal Bankruptcy 
Amendments, supra note 155, at 546 (under balance sheet test, “virtually every municipality . . . is 
insolvent”); also noting that even if municipality’s assets could be seized to pay debts, the assets are 
probably “so tailored to a specific purpose that their value is uncertain at best.”); 133 CONG. REC. 
31822 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (same); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 10 (1988) (same, 
adding “the value of city hall should make little difference to creditors”); id. at 24 (statement of 
Department of Justice views) (“many municipal assets (such as roads) have market values which are 
speculative at best”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 5–6 (1988) (“What is important to creditors is not 
the value of the municipality’s assets, but rather the ability of the municipality to pay its debts.”); 
1988 Hearings, supra note 155, at 559 (“Many municipal assets are special-purpose assets and have 
a highly uncertain market value, which is probably less than cost. Under these circumstances, many 
healthy municipalities would be treated as ‘insolvent’. Also many municipal assets cannot be 
reached to pay debts, rendering the assets vs. liabilities test somewhat irrelevant to creditors.”); id. 
at 655 (letter from Lawrence P. King, Professor, New York University School of Law to the Hon. 
Dennis DeConcini, June 24, 1988) (same).  
157. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i) (2012). 
158. Id. § 101(32)(C)(ii). By contrast, entities other than municipalities are insolvent, loosely 
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Although the legislative history of the 1988 Act does not mention 
taxation, it does reflect a concern with bona fide, legitimate insolvency: 
“financially sound” municipalities would not qualify as insolvent,159 and 
the test would focus on “the ability of the municipality to pay its 
debts.”160 
Congress did not intend that municipalities would be able to invoke 
bankruptcy protection by engineering a technical insolvency. As the 
Report of the National Bankruptcy Conference on the Act stated, “[a] 
deliberate failure to pay indebtedness in order to create eligibility to file 
a petition under this chapter would be grounds for dismissal under 
section 921(c) as failure to file in good faith.”161 
The legislative history of municipal bankruptcy from the 1976 Act on 
indicates that Congress intended, as the 1976 Act House report states, 
that the bankrupt municipality “exercise its taxing power to the fullest 
extent possible for the benefit of its creditors.”162 The report indicates 
that Kelley and Fano support that conclusion—a view with which the 
Ford Administration concurred through the testimony of Assistant 
Attorney General Scalia. Three years after the report, the House and 
Senate sponsors of the 1978 Act expressly stated that they expected the 
courts to be guided by Kelley and Fano. Thus, both major bankruptcy 
statutes from this era reflect an expansive view of the municipality’s 
duty to tax. The 1988 Act did not disturb this view; indeed, the House 
report’s concern with bona fide, legitimate insolvency reinforces the 
view that bankrupt municipalities are to make strenuous efforts to meet 
their obligations. 
                                                     
speaking, when the fair value of nonexempt assets is less than liabilities. Id. § 101(32)(A). The 
definition of insolvency also excludes assets that have been fraudulently transferred away from the 
potentially insolvent entity. Id. § 101(32)(A)(i). There is also a special definition for partnership 
insolvency, but it is based on comparing assets and liabilities. Id. § 101(32)(B). 
159. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 5 (1988); see also 133 CONG. REC. 16231 (statement of Sen. 
DeConcini) (arguing that insolvency test proposed in pending legislation “is directly relevant to the 
financial health of the municipality”); 134 CONG. REC. 598 (Feb. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Edwards) (same). 
160. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 5–6. 
161. BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 155, at 50 (submitted in connection with 
September 8, 1988 testimony of Richard Levin to House Subcommittee on Monopolies and 
Commercial Law). 
162. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 33 (1975) (citing Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 144 
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940)). 
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III. TAXES AND MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY 
The legislative history of the municipal bankruptcy statutes reflects a 
general principle that a municipal population’s unwillingness to tax itself 
to pay for benefits received is relevant to the municipality’s eligibility 
for federal bankruptcy relief. Although this assumption sometimes was 
articulated in connection with particular provisions of the Code, it was 
just as commonly stated as a general background assumption of the 
bankruptcy statute. 
This Part focuses on how the taxes-are-relevant principle has 
appeared in cases applying four specific provisions of the Code
163
: the 
insolvency and good-faith requirements for eligibility and the “best 
interests” and “fair and equitable” tests for plan confirmation.164 The 
Part demonstrates that courts and commentators have recognized that tax 
levels are relevant both to eligibility for municipal bankruptcy and to 
plan confirmation under these four statutory provisions. 
Although much of the authority embracing the principle is older and 
deals with smaller municipalities and special-purpose districts, taxes 
most definitely were found relevant in the recent bankruptcies of larger 
general-purpose municipalities. The written opinions in the Detroit case, 
in which the plan did not raise taxes, suggest that the judge found that 
the city had been taxed to the point where further tax increases would 
not produce any revenue. In the Stockton case, the court relied expressly 
on the fact that the plan was going to propose a tax increase as a reason 
for finding the city eligible for bankruptcy and relied on the fact that the 
voters passed an increase in confirming the plan. 
                                                     
163. Clayton Gillette has identified three of these four provisions: insolvency, good faith 
negotiations, and best interests of creditors. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 46, at 293–96. 
This Article identifies additional precedents and discussing the authorities in greater detail in the 
course of making a different argument about municipal taxes. 
164. Taxes also are relevant to the requirement that a plan be “feasible,” 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) 
(2012), and the related requirement that the plan provide “adequate means for [its] implementation,” 
id. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) into Chapter 9); see also Reporter’s Transcript of 
Proceedings: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 33–34, In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 12-32118-C-9) [hereinafter Stockton Transcript] (evaluating tax levels 
in connection with finding that plan of adjustment had adequate means for its implementation). 
However, these provisions address an aspect of municipal bankruptcy that is not the main concern 
of this Article. They address whether the city will be able to make the payments its plan proposes. 
Id. The more debts are cut, the more feasible a plan becomes. This Article focuses on the constraints 
that apply to the decision to cut debts in the first place. 
07 - Hunt.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
546 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:515 
 
A. The Insolvency Requirement: Unable, Not Unwilling 
Chapter 9 requires that a debtor be insolvent as a condition of filing 
for relief.
165
 Insolvency means that the debtor is “generally not paying its 
debts as they become due”166 or is “unable to pay its debts as they 
become due.”167 Demonstrating insolvency under the Code requires 
something more than showing that the debtor is in financial trouble,
168
 
but exactly what that “something more” is has proven more difficult to 
define. 
General-purpose municipalities typically have filed under Chapter 9 
before actually running out of cash and therefore have tended to rely on 
the “unable to pay” branch of the insolvency test.169 This provision, as 
phrased, would seem to confer upon the court the discretion to decide 
that a municipality is “able to pay” if taxes could provide the revenue 
needed to meet obligations. However, no court has gone so far as to say 
exactly that, although municipalities have been found insolvent if they 
could take other unusual measures, such as issuing warrants, to get 
cash.
170
 Moreover, one articulation of the “unable to pay” standard, the 
                                                     
165. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). The burden of proof of insolvency is on the debtor. In re Boise Cty., 
465 B.R. 156, 171 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). 
166. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i). Failure to pay a single debt, for example, does not establish that 
the municipality is “generally” failing to pay debts when due. Boise Cty., 456 B.R. at 171. 
167. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(ii). The 1988 Act added this definition of insolvency. Act of Nov. 3, 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-597, § 1, 102 Stat. 3028, 3028. Previously, the Code had provided that a 
municipality must be “insolvent or unable to meet such entity’s debts as such debts mature” to seek 
bankruptcy protection, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 109, 92 Stat. 2549, 2557, and 
municipalities were subject to the general definition of insolvency: that the entity’s debts were 
greater than the fair value of the entity’s nonexempt property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A). The change 
reflects the general perception that municipal property cannot be levied on to satisfy the 
municipality’s creditors. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 263 (1977); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 52, ¶ 900.02[2][c], at 900-21. 
168. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 328, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (“[T]he issue is not 
whether Bridgeport was in financial trouble, but rather whether it was insolvent when it filed.”); In 
re Hamilton Creek Metro. Dist., 143 F.3d 1381, 1386 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[I]nability to pay under 
§ 101(32)(C)(ii) ‘depend[s] upon the inescapable quality of the obligation and the certainty that it 
cannot be met. Mere possibility or even speculative probability is not enough.’” (quoting In re 
Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 865 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997))). 
169. See Stockton, 493 B.R. at 787 (“[T]he City relies on the second [“unable to pay”] prong of 
the municipal insolvency definition.”); In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813-A-9, 2008 WL 4180008, 
at *22 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (“[T]he City must demonstrate that . . . it will be unable to 
pay debts as they become due.”); City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 334 (“The issue here is whether 
Bridgeport was ‘unable to pay its debts as they become due.’”). Detroit is a notable exception: it 
was both unable to pay its debts and not paying its debts when it filed. In re City of Detroit, 504 
B.R. 97, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“The Court finds that the City . . . is . . . insolvent under 
both definitions.”). 
170.  In Boise County, the court found that the debtor county was not insolvent because the 
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cash-flow test, focuses on whether it is “imminent and certain”171 that 
the municipality will run out of money to pay its debts. The cash-flow 
test on its face seems to look to whether the city will run out of money, 
not to whether it could avoid running out by raising taxes.
172
 
Nevertheless, courts frequently suggest that the ability to raise taxes is 
relevant to the municipality’s insolvency. Many insolvency decisions 
rely on findings that raising taxes would be revenue-decreasing
173
 or 
legally impermissible
174
 rather than on a proposition that the ability to 
raise taxes does not matter in evaluating insolvency.
175
 
                                                     
relevant fund could issue warrants to pay all its outstanding debts and the county could transfer 
surplus moneys from other funds to pay off the warrants in the following year. 465 B.R. at 179. 
171. City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R at 337. Because default must be “imminent and certain” under 
section 101(32)(C)(ii), courts have been reluctant to find insolvency based on projections that look 
too far into the future. See Boise County, 465 B.R. at 172 (noting that the test under section 
101(32)(C)(ii) “requires the petitioner to prove as of the petition date an inability to pay debts as 
they come due in its current fiscal year or, based on an adopted budget, in its next fiscal year”); City 
of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 337 (finding that Bridgeport was not insolvent where “it is uncontested 
that Bridgeport will not run out of cash this fiscal year”); see also id. at 338 (noting that projections 
of default in the following fiscal year were too speculative to support a finding of insolvency 
because of, among other reasons, possible “increased tax collection rates”). 
172. See In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 290 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (affirming bankruptcy 
court’s finding of insolvency based on cash-flow test; objecting party did not argue for tax increases 
or challenge appropriateness of cash-flow test itself); City of Vallejo, 2008 WL 4180008 at *22 
(finding city insolvent based on cash-flow test; not addressing the possibility of tax increases); id. at 
*17 (criticizing report of objecting party’s expert that called for tax increases on the ground that 
voter approval would be required and “in the current economic and political environment, the City 
reasonably believes that voter approval of any additional taxes and assessments is unlikely”); City of 
Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 337 (“[S]olvency should be judged by a cash flow, not a budget deficiency, 
analysis.”). 
173. See Moody v. James Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1940) (rejecting challenge 
to insolvency on ground that “[t]he taxing power of the petitioner District ha[d] practically become 
exhausted”); In re Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 27 F. Supp. 322, 326–27 (S.D. Cal. 1939), aff’d sub 
nom. Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940) (rejecting argument that 
irrigation district was not insolvent and finding that evidence of delinquencies showed that the 
district had exhausted “the ability of the taxpayer or toll payer to pay” and thus reached “tax 
saturation,” a “limit beyond the which the taxing power of a taxing agency cannot go, even in the 
absence of legal limitations”); In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 84 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding district insolvent even though “a dramatically increased mill 
levy . . . would allow owners, theoretically, to produce the revenues required to meet District 4’s 
current financial obligations” because “it is highly doubtful that the taxes which would be required 
from District 1 property owners could be collected”); cf. City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 335 
(reporting that “it has been argued that anything more than a modest tax increase would be 
counterproductive” but not further analyzing this contention in determining that debtor was not 
insolvent). 
174. See In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (finding 
authority insolvent in part on ground that it was not legally permitted to increase rents or sell 
property). 
175. One court found that rate increases might be counterproductive and illegal, and also 
apparently that the ability to raise rates was irrelevant to insolvency. In re Pleasant View Util. Dist., 
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In particular, the recent major cases of Stockton and Detroit both 
demanded “bona fide financial distress,”176 as distinguished from a 
“technical”177 or “engineered”178 insolvency, and both decisions found 
taxes relevant. Both cases treated the city’s ability to extricate itself from 
financial distress by raising taxes as relevant to whether the municipality 
faces bona fide insolvency. 
In re City of Stockton
179
 stressed the importance of good-faith 
insolvency and found taxes relevant to the city’s good faith. The court 
started with the proposition that “the municipality must be in bona fide 
financial distress that is not likely to be resolved with use of the federal 
exclusive bankruptcy power to impair contracts.”180 Accordingly, the 
court found Stockton was cash-flow insolvent,
181
 but did not stop there: 
cash-flow insolvency was not enough. The court went on to evaluate the 
claim of capital market objectors that the insolvency was “engineered 
and not genuine.”182 In so doing, the court considered two other concepts 
of insolvency, “service delivery insolvency” and “budget insolvency.”183 
Service delivery insolvency indicates the city’s inability to “pay for 
all the costs of providing services at the level and quality required for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the community.”184 Noting that Stockton’s 
police department had been “decimated,” that crime had “soared,” and 
“[h]omicides [were] at record levels,” with police “often respond[ing] 
only to crimes-in-progress,”185 the court concluded that the city was a 
“paradigm example of service delivery insolvency.”186 This finding in 
turn bolstered the ultimate conclusion—that Stockton was insolvent in 
                                                     
24 B.R. 632, 639 n.6 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982). It is difficult to know what to make of this 
decision, which has been cited only once for its tax-related holding, in In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l 
Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 78 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (“[D]ebtors coming into the 
bankruptcy courts under Chapter 9 do not have to demonstrate that they have fully exercised their 
taxing powers to the maximum extent possible.”). Sullivan County, in which the court held that the 
debtor was ineligible for Chapter 9 because it did not file its petition in good faith, is discussed in 
more detail infra Section III.B.  
176. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (quoting In re City of 
Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013)). 
177. Stockton, 493 B.R. at 791. 
178. Id. at 789. 
179. Id. at 772. 
180. Id. at 788. 
181. Id. at 789. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 781. 
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 789–90. 
186. Id. at 790. 
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good faith: “[t]hat [Stockton] was service delivery insolvent confirms 
that the cash insolvency was not a mere technical insolvency.”187 The 
court also found that the city was “budget insolvent,” meaning that it 
was not able to “create a balanced budget that provides sufficient 
revenues to pay for its expenses that occur within the budgeted period,” 
including future years.
188
 This finding likewise supported the conclusion 
that Stockton’s insolvency was genuine.189 
The Stockton court treated taxes as relevant to the question of bona 
fide insolvency.
190
 The court directly addressed the capital-market 
creditors’ argument that the city should have tried to raise taxes before 
filing for bankruptcy and credited testimony that it would have been 
futile to seek a pre-bankruptcy tax increase because voters would not 
have approved it.
191
 
The Detroit opinion quoted Stockton when it affirmed the requirement 
of “bona fide financial distress.”192 Although Detroit was not as explicit 
as Stockton in considering taxes in determining good-faith insolvency, 
the decision did evaluate insolvency against a background finding that 
“[t]he City cannot legally increase its tax revenues.”193 If Detroit had 
been able to raise more money by increasing taxes, the finding of 
insolvency could—and likely would—have been different. 
Stockton and Detroit were not the first opinions to stress bona fide 
insolvency and to find a connection between that concept and the legal 
or practical ability to raise revenues through taxing. For example, a 
bankruptcy court found that the town of Westlake, Texas was not 
insolvent because it had options short of bankruptcy available to it for 
paying its debts.
194
 The court held that the Bankruptcy Code’s 
insolvency test “does not appear to encompass a situation where a 
municipality deliberately budgets or spends itself into 
insolvency . . . when other realistic avenues and scenarios are 
possible.”195 Although the court did not go so far as to say that the city 
                                                     
187. Id. at 791. 
188. Id. at 790. 
189. Id. at 791 (“[I]nsolvency would persist without realignment of revenues and expenses.”). 
190. Id. at 790. 
191. Id.  
192. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
193. Id. at 121. 
194. In re Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 866–67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997) (noting 
unnecessary and unusual expenditures in the town budget and the town’s untapped ability to raise 
taxes as reasons for finding that “there was insufficient credible proof that Westlake is unable to pay 
its debts as they come due”). 
195. Id. at 867; see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 52, ¶109.04[3][d][iii], at 109-30 
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could have avoided bankruptcy by raising taxes, the court did mention 
the city’s untapped ability to impose an ad valorem tax in the course of 
deciding the city was not insolvent.
196
 
California requires electoral approval of most new taxes,
197
 and it is 
worth specifically emphasizing how bankruptcy courts in California 
have treated this requirement in their insolvency opinions. The courts in 
the recent major California general municipal bankruptcies in which 
insolvency was litigated, those of Vallejo and Stockton,
198
 have not 
pushed back against California’s electoral-approval requirement.199 Both 
courts rejected arguments that the city was not insolvent because it could 
raise taxes, basing the conclusion at least in part on the proposition that 
the voters would not approve the suggested tax increases. In Stockton, 
for example, the court rejected the capital market creditors’ argument 
that the city was solvent because it did not “go to the people for a tax 
increase before filing a chapter 9 case.”200 The court credited testimony 
from Stockton’s city manager that the voters probably would have 
rejected a tax increase.
201
 
The cases therefore could be understood to stand for the proposition 
that a city may be insolvent in good faith if city voters would refuse to 
approve taxes to meet municipal obligations, no matter what the city’s 
ability to pay or current tax level.
202
 But such an understanding is 
                                                     
(“A municipality cannot deliberately budget or spend itself into insolvency when other scenarios are 
possible.”). 
196. Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. at 867. Town of Westlake involved unusual facts. The town’s 
reason for seeking bankruptcy protection may have been to get access to the bankruptcy court’s 
avoidance powers to reverse the contested disannexation of a business park rather than to adjust 
debts. Id. at 862–63. Moreover, the city’s budget, adopted immediately before the hearing to dismiss 
the bankruptcy petition, included major unexplained increases in expenses from prior years. Id. at 
866. 
197. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (assuming that a tax 
increase sufficient to affect city’s insolvency would require electoral approval). 
198. An objection to insolvency in the San Bernardino case was withdrawn. See, e.g., In re City 
of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that an employee association 
withdrew its objection to city’s claim of insolvency). 
199. It might be argued, for example, that applying electoral approval requirements for taxes to a 
bankrupt municipality impermissibly invades the federal bankruptcy power and therefore is not 
protected by section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, which preserves state control of municipal 
political and governmental authority in bankruptcy. Cf. City of Stockton, 526 B.R. at 37 (finding that 
California law prohibiting municipality’s rejection of a CalPERS pension servicing contract in 
bankruptcy amounts to “usurp[ing] the exclusive power of Congress to legislate uniform laws on the 
subject of bankruptcy”). 
200. Stockton, 493 B.R. at 790. 
201. Id. 
202. At least one other court seems to have rejected that argument. See In re Ellicott School Bldg. 
Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (“It is clear that the School District’s taxpayers 
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incomplete. In Stockton, the court did not find that the population had no 
responsibility to raise taxes; by contrast, its insolvency opinion makes 
clear that bankruptcy was itself a way of getting to a settlement that 
included taxes. As the court put it, “the extra revenues needed to fund a 
plan of adjustment probably will have to come from tax increases,”203 
and bankruptcy was a vehicle for passing such increases: 
[S]uccessful local tax measures for general-purpose revenues 
occur in an atmosphere in which the predicate message is that 
the fiscal house is already in order. Putting the fiscal house in 
order so that voters might be willing to entertain tax increases is 
the whole point of chapter 9.
204
 
As it turned out, the court was right; the bankruptcy plan was in fact 
the vehicle for a successful tax-increase campaign in Stockton.
205
 
In Vallejo, the court found the city insolvent despite an objector’s 
claim that Vallejo should have tried to increase taxes. The court’s 
decision was based in part on the city’s argument that a tax increase 
would not pass muster with the voters.
206
 But the court had numerous 
independent grounds for its finding of insolvency, including that it did 
not find the objectors’ expert credible,207 that the objectors’ expert did 
not in fact conclude that the city was not insolvent,
208
 and that objectors’ 
counsel admitted that efforts to avoid bankruptcy by enhancing revenue 
were unlikely to work for reasons other than the difficulty of getting 
electoral approval.
209
 Moreover, the ultimate outcome in Vallejo was a 
tax increase
210
 that the voters approved,
211
 so it is difficult to make the 
                                                     
were unwilling to authorize additional tax expenditures to meet the School District’s lease 
payments. That does not, however, lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Authority is 
insolvent.”). 
203. Stockton, 493 B.R. at 790. 
204. Id. 
205. See infra Section III.C. 
206. In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813-A-9, 2008 WL 4180008, at *17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 
5, 2008) (“[I]n the current economic and political environment, the City reasonably believes that 
voter approval of any additional taxes and assessments is unlikely.”). 
207. Id. at *16 (noting that an expert damaged his credibility by initially declining the 
assignment, then reversing himself and taking it after determining that the city’s bankruptcy case 
would harm his other clients). 
208. Id. at *17 (“The basic problem with [the expert’s] report and testimony was that he did not 
conclude that the City was not insolvent.”). 
209. Id. 
210. See Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486402778541450 
[https://perma.cc/738Y-G5Q9].  
211. See Rachel Raskin-Zrihen, New Vallejo Sales Tax Rates Begin April 1, Rise to 8.375 
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case stand for the proposition that taxes are irrelevant in municipal 
bankruptcy. 
B. The Good Faith Requirement: Bankruptcy’s Intended Purpose 
The Detroit and Stockton courts found good faith relevant to 
insolvency. But good faith is more than that; it is also an explicit 
requirement for filing, and courts occasionally have emphasized a 
distinction between insolvency and good faith.
212
 The court may dismiss 
a Chapter 9 case at any time if the petition is not filed in good faith,
213
 
and courts have taken the municipality’s taxing power into account in 
deciding whether to exercise this discretion. 
The good-faith requirement is an appropriate statutory provision 
through which to apply the principle that taxes are relevant. The idea 
that municipalities should not walk away from debts they can afford to 
pay appears throughout the legislative history of municipal bankruptcy, 
as shown in Part III, but is not clearly encapsulated in so many words in 
any provision of the Code. The good-faith rule captures such situations. 
In the words of one court: “[t]he primary function of the good faith 
requirement has always been to ensure the integrity of the reorganization 
process by limiting access to its protection to those situations for which 
                                                     
Percent, VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/article/ZZ/ 
20120322/NEWS/120326441 [https://perma.cc/VK2K-QPZX]. 
212. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disp. Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 75–76 (Bankr. D.N.H. 
1994) (holding that the district’s failure to levy a special assessment is relevant to district’s 
eligibility for bankruptcy, but under the heading of good faith rather than that of insolvency); In re 
McCurtain Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2007) 
(“[T]he failure to impose assessments, if relevant at all, concerns ‘good faith’ issues, not a Debtor’s 
insolvency status.”). 
213. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2012); see also 1988 Hearings¸ supra note 155, at 560 (Report of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference on Proposed Municipal Bankruptcy Amendments) (“A deliberate 
failure to pay indebtedness in order to create eligibility to file a petition under this chapter would be 
grounds for dismissal . . . [for] failure to file in good faith.”). Other provisions of Chapter 9 require 
good faith but are not discussed here: The debtor must “negotiate[] in good faith with creditors” and 
“fail[] to obtain” their agreement as a condition of filing the Chapter 9 petition unless the debtor has 
obtained the agreement of a majority of impaired creditors, reasonably believes that a creditor may 
seek an avoidable transfer, or can show that negotiation with creditors is impracticable. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(c)(5)(B)–(D); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-938, at 17 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that the 
negotiation-related requirement’s “purpose . . . is to limit accessibility to the bankruptcy court 
somewhat, as does current law, without making the accessibility requirement so stringent as to 
preclude relief in a situation in which the petitioner is confronted with stubborn or overly hasty 
creditors, or creditors whose identities are unknown because of the existence of a large number of 
bonds in bearer form”); S. REP. NO. 95-589, at 111 (1978) (same). A plan may not be confirmed 
unless it is filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) into 
Chapter 9); id. § 1129(a)(3) requiring that plan be proposed “in good faith and not by any means 
forbidden by law”). 
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it was intended.”214 
The analysis in the Stockton and Detroit cases
215
 suggests that taxes 
are relevant to good faith, just as the decisions find taxes relevant to 
insolvency. Stockton did not directly mention the relevance of taxes 
when it held that Stockton proceeded in good faith, but the court did find 
that “the extent of the City’s prepetition efforts”216 to address its 
insolvency was a factor to be considered in determining good faith. The 
court focused on Stockton’s efforts to cut expenses in evaluating this 
factor.
217
 
Detroit expressly looked to taxes in deciding that the city’s 
prepetition efforts to address its debts were adequate. The court relied on 
the facts that the city had “increas[ed] the City’s corporate tax rate, 
work[ed] to improve the City’s ability to collect taxes, and increas[ed] 
lighting rates”218 in finding that the city’s prepetition efforts supported a 
conclusion that the city acted in good faith. 
At least one court has dismissed a Chapter 9 case because of a 
government’s failure to exercise its power to collect from its members. 
The court in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District
219
 
dismissed a petition for lack of good faith because the debtors did not 
use their power to assess their members. The debtors in the case were 
two waste disposal districts, each with several towns and cities as 
members.
220
 The districts had formed a joint venture to contract with a 
                                                     
214. Sullivan Cty., 165 B.R. at 80.  
215. In San Bernardino, the court found that the municipality acted in good faith without 
analyzing possible tax increases, perhaps taking into account the fact that the city apparently did not 
realize the depth of its financial problems in time to seek a tax increase before filing for bankruptcy. 
See In re City of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 790 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (“City cannot achieve 
a balanced budget unless it is allowed to reorganize its debt”); id. at 791 (“paucity of options for a 
City with such substantial, undisputed fiscal woes”). Apparently, San Bernardino was not aware of 
the depth of its problems until it had already run out of money to pay its employees. See id. at 780 
(noting that the “first comprehensive report to the Common Council regarding the fiscal crisis” was 
July 10, 2012); id. at 790 (“City could no longer pay its employees on July 1st.”). It does not seem 
that San Bernardino had time to present a tax increase to the voters before running out of money. 
216. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). The Stockton court 
found that the city establishes a presumption of good faith by showing that it meets the other 
Chapter 9 eligibility requirements. 
217. Id. at 795.  
218. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
219. 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); see also West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation 
Dist., 114 F.2d 654. 670 (9th Cir. 1940) (irrigation district’s failure to levy taxes was not bad faith 
where “[c]ontinued levying of taxes would result in ‘pyramiding’ debts upon the diminishing 
taxpayer acres”). 
220. Sullivan Cty., 165 B.R. at 63–64. 
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private company to build and operate an incinerator.
221
 The project was 
to be funded through operating revenues such as tipping fees, but the 
districts were obligated to the project operator and had the power to 
assess their member towns and cities for shortfalls.
222
 The districts did 
not even try to use this assessment power until the day before their 
bankruptcy filing, when the district boards both voted against an 
assessment to cover the shortfall.
223
 
The court found that the districts did not file their petition in good 
faith,
224
 although it agreed that “debtors . . . do not have to demonstrate 
that they have fully exercised their taxing powers to the maximum extent 
possible.”225 The court found that the districts failed the test because 
they “never exercised their assessment powers prior to coming into 
bankruptcy court”226 and “ignored any timely resort to their primary 
asset”227 (that is, their assessment power). The court’s summary of the 
districts’ misbehavior describes the type of opportunistic bankruptcy this 
Article addresses: “[t]he debtors created their own problem of a massive 
debt by signing a contract and then refusing to face up to their 
obligations under that contract with steadfast refusal to exercise their 
assessment powers.”228 
Other cases have found tax levels relevant but have rejected tax-level-
based challenges to good faith because the municipality’s taxes were 
already high relative to its peers’.229 Although one case may have 
rejected a good-faith challenge to a plan based on electoral infeasibility 
                                                     
221. Id. at 65  
222. Id. at 65–66. 
223. Id. at 66. 
224. Id. at 79 (districts did not negotiate in good faith); id. at 82 (districts did not file in good 
faith). 
225. Id. at 78. 
226. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original); id. at 82 (“steadfast refusal to exercise their assessment 
powers”). 
227. Id. at 78. 
228. Id. at 82. 
229. In re Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 145 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that a 
school district facing large judgment for discharged teachers did not act in bad faith in filing 
Chapter 9 when “the school board [was] already assessing the highest levy in the county” and 
stating that “[t]o say that they had to institute the highest possible levy (requiring state approval) 
before taking any other action or be guilty of bad faith filing, is unreasonable”); In re McCurtain 
Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *6 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2007) (municipal water 
and sewer authority did not file in bad faith where water and sewer rates in the municipality were 
“significantly higher than rates in surrounding areas” and “it is unlikely that sufficient funds could 
have been generated through the imposition of higher water and sewer rates or an assessment on 
[local] citizens”). Such cases employ the “top of the range” standard discussed in more detail below. 
See infra Section IV.B.3.  
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alone, without substantively considering the level of taxes,
230
 the weight 
of authority supports the proposition that voters cannot simply walk 
away from obligations in bankruptcy without some judicial inquiry into 
taxation. 
It is true that the good-faith requirement’s bite may be reduced by a 
rule, first articulated in Stockton and followed in Detroit, that the city 
establishes a presumption of good faith by showing that the other 
requirements for eligibility are met.
231
 The new rule effectively puts the 
burden of production of evidence of bad faith on the parties objecting to 
the plan.
232
 Nevertheless, it appears that taxation continues to be relevant 
to the substantive content of the good-faith standard. 
C. The “Best Interests of Creditors” Requirement: All That Creditors 
Can Reasonably Expect 
A bankruptcy court cannot confirm a municipal plan of adjustment 
unless the court finds that the plan “is in the best interests of creditors 
and is feasible.”233 Other scholars have suggested that this provision 
supplies the strongest basis for arguing that bankruptcy courts may 
condition relief on tax increases.
234
 
Although authority giving specific content to the phrase “best 
interests of creditors” is sparse, the text has been understood in a general 
sense to mean that creditors must receive all they “can reasonably expect 
to receive in the circumstances.”235 As one leading treatise reports, 
“[c]ourts have interpreted the test . . . to mean that the plan must be 
better for creditors than realistic alternatives . . . . A plan that makes little 
                                                     
230. See In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that it 
would be a “futile exercise” for the debtor hospital district to seek to increase assessments). The 
court did not state precisely why seeking a tax increase would be futile, but it did note the city 
manager’s testimony that voters would be unlikely to approve a tax increase to support the hospital 
district, despite the fact that “the residents . . . see [the hospital] as an essential element to the 
survival of Corcoran as a community.” Id. at 454. The court’s interpretation can, however, be 
interpreted as resting on the legal incorrectness of an argument that “the debtor has the obligation 
under California law to maximize its taxing power in order to pay its creditors,” id. at 459, rather 
than on electoral futility, see id. at 459–60. 
231. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013); In re City of Detroit, 
504 B.R. 97, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
232. See Stockton, 493 B.R. at 795 (explaining burden of production). 
233. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). 
234. McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 474–75. 
235. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 52, ¶ 943.03[1][f][B], at 943-16. (stating that under 
the test, “it is not necessary that . . . taxes be increased”). The only authority cited for the latter 
proposition is Corcoran, discussed infra.  
07 - Hunt.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
556 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:515 
 
or no effort to repay creditors may not be in their best interests . . . .”236 
The court in Detroit found that tax levels are relevant to the “best 
interests of creditors” test, a point the city had conceded.237 In its 
confirmation opinion,
238
 the court “address[ed] the argument of some 
creditors that the City could pay them more by raising taxes.”239 The 
court found that Detroit was “simply unable to pay [its creditors] by 
raising taxes.”240 It credited testimony from the city’s chief financial 
officers that raising taxes “would not result in increased revenues” and 
that tax increases risked a “death spiral” wherein tax increases actually 
caused revenues to decrease.
241
 In addition to this argument that tax 
increases were economically infeasible, the court also referenced its 
earlier ruling that tax increases were illegal.
242
 
As noted, the eligibility decision in Stockton anticipated a tax 
increase.
243
 At confirmation, the court relied on the fact that the city had 
adopted sales tax increase “in the greatest amount and for the longest 
period permitted by California law”244 and that the increase was integral 
                                                     
236. 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 3D 90:31 (2014), Westlaw (database updated 2016). The treatise recognizes that “the 
municipality cannot commit so much of its revenues to repay debts that it cannot maintain its 
ongoing governmental functions.” Id.  
237. Consolidated Reply to Certain Objections to Confirmation of Fourth Amended Plan for the 
Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 74, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 180 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 2013) (No. 13-53846) (noting that Detroit has “acknowledge[d] that it is appropriate for 
the Court to consider the City’s ability to levy additional taxes in considering whether the Plan 
should be confirmed”). Detroit argued that it should not be required to raise taxes because doing so 
would be futile, and therefore counterproductive, in light of the city’s already-high taxes and 
depressed condition. Detroit cited its “substantial and increasing rates of tax delinquency” in 
support of this argument, and noted that “the abundance of vacant, foreclosed, and abandoned 
properties in the City renders raising property taxes a fool’s errand.” Id. at 81–82. Notably, the 
parties arguing that the city should have sought higher tax revenues were bond insurers rather than 
representatives of pension beneficiaries. 
238. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
239. Id. at 213. 
240. Id. at 216. 
241. Id. at 215; see also id. at 216 (citing testimony that “the City is at tax saturation 
and . . . raising taxes would likely add to the population decline”). 
242. Id. at 216 (citing Detroit, 504 B.R. at 121, for the proposition that “the City cannot legally 
increase its tax rates”). The court buttressed its findings that tax increases were economically 
infeasible and legally impossible with a finding that they were electorally infeasible. Id. at 216 
(“[T]he likelihood is remote that the people of Detroit or the state legislature would vote to raise 
taxes.”). 
243. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (“[A] budget can be 
returned to solvency with a combination of debt adjustment and revenue enhancement, as 
appropriate to the particular situation.”). 
244. In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015). 
07 - Hunt.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016  3:50 PM 
2016] TAXES AND MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 557 
 
to the city’s plan of adjustment.245 Although the court did not expressly 
tie the tax increase to the best interests test,
246
 its analysis suggests that 
the overall picture would have been different without the tax increase. 
Stockton and Detroit are consistent with a rule that the “best interests 
of creditors” test includes consideration of tax levels, including what tax 
levels are economically and legally feasible. Such a rule is consistent 
with precedent, in particular with Kelley and Fano, the two cases that 
have a special place in the legislative history of the 1976 and 1978 
Acts.
247
 
In Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District,
248
 the Supreme Court 
reversed an appellate decision affirming confirmation of a municipal 
bankruptcy plan on the ground that the district court had not made 
findings sufficient to allow appellate review of the decision to 
confirm.
249
 In particular, the court found that where debts are to be 
repaid from tax revenues, the court must consider “probable future 
revenues available for the satisfaction of creditors.”250 In the case at 
hand, “[a]ppropriate facts” to consider included past tax revenues, 
current rates, and the present assessed value of property, as well as “the 
probable effect on future revenues of a revision in the tax structure . . . , 
the extent of past tax delinquencies, and any general economic 
conditions of the District which may reasonably be expected to affect the 
percentage of future delinquencies.”251 The ability to raise revenues by 
raising taxes was relevant to confirmation of a plan. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision overturning confirmation of a 
composition
252
 in Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation District
253
 is even 
more pointed. Given that the irrigation district’s tax delinquency rate 
was less than five percent,
254
 the court stated: 
[W]e are unable to find any reason why the tax rate should not 
                                                     
245. Id. at 62. 
246. See Stockton Transcript, supra note 164, at 40–41 (interpreting best-interests standard to 
require “the best that is available under the circumstances”). The court did not expressly address the 
best-interests standard in its written opinion on confirmation. See Stockton, 526 B.R. 35. 
247. See supra Sections II.B.2 & II.B.3. 
248. 319 U.S. 415 (1943). 
249. Id. at 422. 
250. Id. at 420. 
251. Id. at 420–21 (emphasis added). 
252. A “composition” under the 1937 Act was the rough equivalent of a “plan of adjustment” 
under the current statute. 
253. 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940). 
254. Id. at 565 n.2. 
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have been increased sufficiently to meet the District’s 
obligations or why it can be said that the plan is “equitable” and 
“fair” and for the “best interest of the creditors” with no 
sufficient showing that the taxing power was inadequate to raise 
the taxes to pay them.
255
 
Fano certainly supports the proposition that taxes are relevant to plan 
confirmation; it could be read to go farther and require that taxes be 
raised as high as economically feasible before a plan is confirmed. 
To be sure, at least one case has directly rejected a challenge to plan 
confirmation based on tax levels. In In re Sanitary & Improvement 
District No. 7,
256
 the bankruptcy court rebuffed bondholders’ contention 
that under the best interests test, it was the “duty of the [debtor] to levy 
sufficient taxes to pay the claims as they existed on the date of the 
petition plus accruing interest.”257 However, even this decision could be 
read as turning on the fact that tax increases would not raise revenue 
because the municipality had passed the peak of the “revenue hill.” The 
court found that trying to impose taxes that would pay the bondholders 
in full with interest “would create such a high level of taxes for the 
district and the homeowners that it is likely the revenues would not be 
made available to the district by taxpayers and the bondholders would 
still not be paid.”258 
Confirmed bankruptcy plans for municipal general governments, rare 
though they are,
259
 also support the proposition that taxes are relevant.
260
 
                                                     
255. Id. at 565–66.  
256. 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). 
257. Id. at 974. 
258. Id. at 976. 
259. Filings are rare, see Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING.COM (Dec. 3, 
2013), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-
defaults.html [https://perma-archives.org/warc/JQZ6-GG9U] (indicating that there have been only 
eight general-purpose government bankruptcies since 2010), and many cases are resolved by 
dismissal, either voluntary, see Order Dismissing Chapter 9 Case, In re Town of Mammoth Lakes, 
No. 2012-32463, DC No. FJ-6 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012), or involuntary, see In re City of 
Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 765 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011), notice of appeal stricken, 462 B.R. 510 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011), appeal dismissed, 2012 WL 315403 (M.D. Pa. 2012); In re Boise Cty., 465 
B.R. 156, 180 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011), rather than through confirmation of a plan of adjustment.  
260. Considering tax levels as part of the best interests test is also the historical practice, at least 
according to Orange County’s lead bankruptcy counsel. See Adam J. Levitin, Experts Examine 
Municipal Financial Distress, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2009–Jan. 2010, at 28, 79 (comments of 
Bruce Bennett) (“Historically, courts have gotten involved in deciding how much taxes have to be 
raised prior to the court confirming a plan that pays debt less than in full. They don’t do it directly, 
as the court doesn’t have the power to raise taxes, but the court has the power to approve a plan as 
being in the best interest of creditors. When considering whether a plan is in the best interest of 
creditors, the court decides whether a municipality has exerted extensive enough efforts to raise 
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Stockton, discussed above, is not the only city to have included a tax 
increase in its confirmed plan of reorganization. Indeed, where such 
increases are feasible, unlike in Detroit, they appear to the norm for 
confirmed plans. Jefferson County, Alabama’s bankruptcy, the largest 
municipal bankruptcy other than Detroit’s, was resolved with a plan that 
increased municipal sewer rates.
261
 One of the only two cities other than 
Detroit
262
 to have cut pensions in bankruptcy (Central Falls, Rhode, 
Island) included tax increases in its confirmed plan.
263
 And most 
recently, the city in the largest pending bankruptcy, San Bernardino, 
California, has proposed a recovery plan calling for tax increases along 
with its plan of adjustment.
264
 
A more determinate version of the best-interests standard, embraced 
by some scholars
265
 and courts,
266
 is worth comment. In general, the 
                                                     
money.”). 
261. See Chapter 9 Plan of Adjustment for Jefferson County, Alabama at 96–102, In re Jefferson 
County, 484 B.R. 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (No. 11-05736-TBB) (calling for significant initial 
increases in sewer rates, followed by four annual increases of 7.89%, subject to adjustment). 
262. The city of Prichard, Alabama, population approximately 28,000, was the other. Its case was 
ultimately resolved by a plan of adjustment that ratified the settlement of a state-court lawsuit 
between retirees and the city. See Order Confirming Debtor’s Sixth Amended Plan of Adjustment of 
Debts Pursuant to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re City of Prichard, No. 09-15000 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ala. July 8, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Prichard Confirmation Order]; Sixth Amended Disclosure 
Statement of City of Prichard at 14–17, City of Prichard, No. 09-15000 (Jan. 24, 2014) (describing 
treatment of pension claims). 
263. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
41 (2013) (“Property taxes will go up 4 percent a year for the next five years in a city where the 
median income is about $34,000 a year.”); Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the 
City of Central Falls, Rhode Island at 34–36, In re City of Central Falls, No. 11-13105 (Bankr. 
D.R.I. July 27, 2012) (providing for periodic reporting of city budgets and attestation that budgets 
are in material conformity with “Six-Year Financial Projection” and providing that “any 
creditor . . . [or] stakeholder[] . . . [is] hereby granted standing to seek specific enforcement . . . from 
the Bankruptcy Court enforce compliance with the Plan terms if the City or any other person or 
entity takes, or seeks to take, any action(s) which makes or would make the Plan not in Material 
Conformity with the Plan terms”); City of Central Falls, Six-Year Financial Projection FY2012-
FY2017, at 8 (June 15, 2012) (“Property tax revenues are forecasted to grow at the maximum 
allowed according to R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-5-2, which is four and a quarter percent (4.25%) in 
FY2012 and four percent (4.0%) thereafter.”). The Central Falls plan of adjustment was not 
opposed. 
264. See Memorandum from the City of San Bernardino City Manager’s Office on Proposed 
Recovery Plan in Support of the Plan of Adjustment 48 (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.sbcity.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=18772 [https://perma.cc/5K53-B9SM] 
(calling for renewal of temporary sales tax, utility user tax increases, and property transfer tax 
increase). 
265. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 466, 475–76; Frederick Tung, After Orange 
County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 899 n.69 (2002). 
266. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (applying the best-
interests test and stating that “[t]he issue . . . is primarily whether the available state law remedies 
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remedy under nonbankruptcy law is said to be a writ of mandamus 
commanding the city to levy taxes that it is under a statutory or 
contractual duty to levy.
267
 It could be argued by analogy that a city 
satisfies the best-interests standard if the plan of reorganization gives 
creditors whatever they would have been able to receive in mandamus 
actions under state law. This suggestion can be seen as drawing on a 
kind of analogy to Chapter 11. Chapter 11 requires that a plan be as 
good for creditors as liquidation would be, and in that sense ensures that 
creditors get at least as much in a plan as they would get if they were to 
exercise their remedies under nonbankruptcy law.
268
 
There is a certain symmetry in adapting the Chapter 11 standard to the 
municipal context, but it is not clear that doing so honors the 
congressional intention that debts be paid if it is reasonably possible to 
do so. If a state enacts a remedial scheme that makes it difficult to 
collect against municipalities under nonbankruptcy law,
269
 it is by no 
means clear that the city should be able to take advantage of the 
weakness of that scheme to wipe away its debts in bankruptcy if the city 
would not default absent bankruptcy. Even under a weak state-law 
remedial scheme, a city’s preferences might be, in order from most to 
least preferred: (1) eliminate debts in bankruptcy, (2) pay debts in full, 
(3) default and be sued. For example, if a city cares about its reputation, 
it might not default, but might seek bankruptcy protection if doing so 
loses its stigma.
270
 A city should not necessarily be able to shed its debts 
in bankruptcy just because creditors would not recover effectively if they 
did sue, when in fact the city would pay debts rather than being sued if 
bankruptcy relief were not available. 
                                                     
could result in a greater recovery for the City’s creditors than confirmation of the plan”). 
267. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 445–47 (discussing issuance of writs of 
mandamus requiring taxes where there was a “plain duty under state law or contract”). 
268. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (providing that plan must promise nonconsenting 
creditors “not less than the amount such [creditor] would . . . receive or retain if the debtor were 
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title.”). 
269. For example, California law apparently limits property taxes levied to pay voluntary debts to 
the 1% level provided by Proposition 13, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 971(b) (West, Westlaw through 2016 
Reg. Sess.), a limit that would seem to impose a strict limit on the effectiveness of the mandamus 
remedy. See Ventura Grp. Ventures v. Ventura Port Dist., 16 P.3d 717, 722–24 (Cal. 2001) (holding 
that the County of Ventura could not, and could not be judicially ordered to, raise property taxes 
beyond the one-percent level in order to satisfy judgments arising out of the Ventura Port District’s 
breach of contract with a developer). 
270. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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D. The “Fair and Equitable” Requirement: All That the Municipality 
Is Reasonably Able to Pay 
If a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment is to be “crammed down,” that is, 
forced upon a nonconsenting class of impaired creditors, the court must 
find that the plan is “fair and equitable.”271 Commentators have noted 
that the “fair and equitable” standard may require more of taxpayers than 
the insolvency standard for bankruptcy eligibility,
272
 and Fano seems to 
suggest that taxes are relevant under the “fair and equitable” test as well 
as the “best interests” test.273 
Another case from the same era as Fano, also endorsed in the 
legislative history of the 1976 Act,
274
 expressly evaluates taxes in 
connection with the fair and equitable requirement for confirmation. In 
Lorber v. Vista Irrigation District,
275
 the court found that the “fair and 
equitable” requirement meant that bondholders were entitled to “all that 
they [could] reasonably expect in the circumstances,”276 and that to 
satisfy this standard, there should be an evidentiary finding that the plan 
of adjustment calls for payment of “all that the District is reasonably 
able to pay in the circumstances.”277 The ability to levy taxes is part of 
reasonable ability to pay, as the Supreme Court held in Kelley. In that 
case, the Court stated that a determination of the overall fairness of a 
plan requires consideration of “probable future revenues available for 
the satisfaction of creditors.”278 
                                                     
271. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating section 1129(b)(1) into Chapter 9 by reference); id. 
§ 1129(b)(1) (providing that plan can be confirmed without consent of all impaired classes 
(“crammed down”) if certain requirements are met, including a requirement that the plan be “fair 
and equitable”). Prior to the 1978 Act, all municipal bankruptcy plans, not just those that were going 
to be crammed down, had to meet the “fair and equitable” standard. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-260, § 94(b)(1), 90 Stat. 315, 323 (requiring a plan be “fair and equitable” to be confirmed). 
272. See, e.g., 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 52, ¶ 900.02[2][c], at 900-22 n.70 (noting 
that, unlike the eligibility requirement of insolvency, “the fair and equitable rule, if invoked, 
requires use of the taxation power to the fullest extent.”); Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: 
The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1174 (1976) (suggesting that, in 
municipal cases, “[t]he fair and equitable and feasible test should more properly involve a 
comparison between the expenditures and the income necessary for the particular municipality, 
considering in the assessment of income the extent to which taxes can be raised and obtained”). 
273. Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 144 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1940) (mentioning 
both standards). 
274. H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 33 (1975). 
275. 127 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1942). 
276. Id. at 639 (citing cases supporting this proposition).  
277. Id. 
278. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1943) (quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 
94-686, at 32 (1975)); see also West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 654, 
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As discussed in this Part, several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
arguably require courts to take tax levels into account in determining 
whether to confirm a plan or whether the municipality is eligible for 
bankruptcy relief in the first place. By and large, the courts have taken 
tax levels into account when interpreting these provisions. In so doing, 
the courts have acted in a way consistent with the intent of Congress as 
expressed in the legislative history discussed in the previous Part. 
IV. SHARPENING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAX 
LEVELS AND DEBT RELIEF IN FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY 
COURT 
The legislative history thus suggests that Congress intended for 
municipal tax levels to be relevant in deciding whether a municipality is 
eligible for bankruptcy and in deciding whether to approve the 
municipality’s plan of adjustment. The case law illustrates that courts 
have on the whole followed Congress’s intention by taking taxes into 
account for both bankruptcy eligibility and plan confirmation. Yet 
neither the case law nor the legislative history provides a precise answer 
to the question of just how courts are to analyze municipal taxes in 
bankruptcy. 
Before turning to that question, this Part briefly addresses the 
argument that courts are not permitted to take tax levels into account 
because doing so impermissibly invades municipal autonomy. Although 
this argument apparently has not gained traction in the courts and 
although the legislative history contains at least some suggestion that it 
is incorrect, it arguably received a boost from the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
279
 If it is 
                                                     
679 (9th Cir. 1940) (affirming plan confirmation where expert report “entailed a scientific study of 
the tax paying ability of the District” and “support[ed] the conclusion that 51.501 cents on the dollar 
[the amount provided in the plan] is fair and equitable and all that could reasonably be expected in 
all the existing circumstances”); Moody v. James Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1940) 
(affirming confirmation of plan where testimony of a longtime local resident and member of the 
California Districts Securities Committee testified that the amount provided in the plan was “well 
up to the limit of the ability of the lands in the District to meet”); Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore 
Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1940) (based on district’s tax delinquency rate and 
“tabulations of tax performance” in the record, the amount provided in the plan was “all that the 
bondholders can reasonably expect in the circumstances”); Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 
114 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1940) (noting that based on valuation testimony of two agricultural 
economists, value of land was such that the plan was fair and equitable in light of the “probable 
ability of the land to pay in the future”). 
279. __U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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impermissible for Congress to condition Medicaid spending on 
Medicaid expansion, perhaps it is also impermissible for Congress to 
condition municipal bankruptcy relief on the municipality’s achieving 
certain tax levels. Although a full analysis of the constitutional issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the Part argues briefly that municipal 
bankruptcy is different from the context at issue in Sebelius in several 
respects that scholars have found important in applying unconstitutional 
conditions. 
Having rejected the argument that taxes may not be taken into 
account, this Part then evaluates three particular ways courts could go 
about taking taxes into account, all three of which find some support in 
the cases. Two of these approaches refer to absolute tax levels. The first 
would prescribe that taxes be raised to the revenue-maximizing level 
(the “top-of-the-hill” criterion). The second would require that taxes be 
at the top of a range of comparable municipalities (the “top-of-the-
range” criterion). A third approach focuses not on the absolute level of 
taxes, but on whether the plan of adjustment calls for significant 
additional taxes beyond what the city is already charging. The Article 
calls this the “share-some-pain” criterion. This Part argues that a 
combination of the three tests deserves consideration: a municipality’s 
failure to tax at the top of the range before bankruptcy should weigh 
against eligibility unless tax increases would not increase revenues (that 
is, the municipality is past the top of the hill) or bankruptcy would 
enable a solution that gets taxes to the top of the range (that is, 
bankruptcy entails sharing pain to a specified extent). 
A. Potential Limits on the Bankruptcy Court’s Power to Influence 
Municipal Taxes: Sections 903 and 904 and the Tenth Amendment 
Scholars have argued that sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy 
Code limit the court’s power to take taxes into account in municipal 
bankruptcy.
280
 Section 903 preserves “the power of a State to 
control . . . a municipality of . . . such State in the exercise of [its] 
political or governmental powers.”281 Section 904 forbids the court from 
“interfer[ing] with” the municipality’s “political or governmental 
                                                     
280. See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 3, at 472 (stating that section 904 
“[p]resumably . . . precludes the bankruptcy court from exercising the principal common law 
judicial remedy for nonpayment of debts—the order to raise taxes”); Kordana, supra note 90, at 
1059 (“A judicially-compelled tax increase would thus appear to run afoul of Section 904, as might 
the frustration of a municipality’s ability to use Chapter 9 if it did not comply with the judge’s 
desire for a tax increase.”). 
281. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
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powers” or “revenues,” “unless the debtor consents or the plan so 
provides.”282 Thus, section 903 preserves state authority over 
municipalities and section 904 preserves local autonomy as against the 
court. 
It is possible that, by refusing to confirm a plan that does not include 
tax increases or finding that a debtor is ineligible for bankruptcy because 
it refuses to consider tax increases, a court impairs state authority over 
municipalities in violation of section 903 or “interfere[s] with” the 
debtor’s “political or governmental powers” or “revenues” in violation 
of section 904. Collectively, these contentions can be called the 
“interference argument.” 
It does not appear that any court has embraced the interference 
argument, and the legislative history of the municipal bankruptcy 
statutes
283
 does not seem to support it. Although the history contains a 
number of general affirmations of state power over municipalities that 
apparently add little to the statutory text itself,
284
 there is very little 
discussion of the interaction between the no-interference principle 
articulated in general terms in sections 903 and 904 and the taxes-are-
relevant principle affirmed elsewhere in the legislative history and 
                                                     
282. Id. § 904. 
283. The restrictions contained in sections 903 and 904 have been part of the municipal 
bankruptcy statutes from the beginning. For section 903, see Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-
251, § 80(k), 48 Stat. 798, 802–03 (preserving state authority in language of § 903); Act of Aug. 16, 
1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 653, 659 (same); Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
260, § 83, 90 Stat. 315, 316–17 (same). For section 904, see Act of May 24, 1934, § 80(c)(11), 48 
Stat. at 801 (limiting court’s power in language of § 904); Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(c), 50 Stat. at 
657 (same); Act of Apr. 8, 1976, § 82(c), 90 Stat. at 316 (same). There seems to have been no intent 
to change the meaning of these provisions with adoption of the 1978 Act. Compare Act of Nov. 6, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 903, 92 Stat. 2549, with Act of Apr. 8, 1976, § 83; compare Act of 
Nov. 6, 1978, § 904, with Act of Apr. 8, 1976, § 82(c); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 397 (1977) (stating 
that new section 903 “is derived, with stylistic changes, from section 83”); id. at 398 (stating that 
section 904 “adopts the policy of section 82(c) of current law” and “[t]he only change in this section 
from section 82(c) is to conform the section to the style and cross-references of H.R. 8200.”). See 
also 124 CONG. REC. 32403 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (explaining that, as a result of 
discussions between House and Senate leaders, “[t]o the extent Section 903 of the House bill would 
have changed present law, such section is rejected”); id. at 17416 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) 
(concluding the same). 
284. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 264 (“[R]ecent decision of the Supreme Court in Usery 
stressing the concept of non-interference by the Federal government with State governmental 
powers.”); id. at 398 (“[T]he court may not interfere with the choices the municipality makes as to 
what services and benefits it will provide to its inhabitants.”); 134 CONG. REC. 24461, 24584 (1988) 
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (stating that, in recognizing special treatment of revenue bonds in 
bankruptcy, 1988 Act protects “the underlying scheme of State constitutional laws” under which 
“each State has developed its own set of powers, restrictions, and limitations on the financing of 
State and local services”).  
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effectuated through the four statutory provisions discussed earlier.
285
 
One salient piece of the history of the 1976 Act does suggest that a 
court does not interfere with state and municipal power if it imposes 
conditions on relief, because the municipality consents to such 
conditions by seeking bankruptcy relief in the first place. In explaining 
proposed section 805(e) of S. 2597, the Ford Administration’s proposal 
for municipal bankruptcy for large cities, which contained virtually 
identical language to section 904,
286
 then-Assistant Attorney General 
Scalia stated: 
The court’s influence over what the city may do exists only 
because the court may obtain the city’s voluntary agreement to 
certain actions in order to obtain debt certificates or in order to 
get the plan approved as being a feasible plan and one that will 
result in a fiscally sound city budget. 
  But the judge has no authority by reason of the proceeding to 
say you do this, you do not do that, and this is how the city runs. 
He obtains that authority only because the city voluntarily 
agrees to certain of these actions in order to obtain measures that 
it wants from the court or to get a certain type of plan finally 
approved by the court.
287
 
Thus, at least one (deceased) Justice of the Supreme Court has argued 
that judges can attach conditions to relief that cities seek without 
violating the Bankruptcy Code provision preserving municipal 
autonomy. Scalia made the argument while acting as an administration 
official, but when given the legislative history, the precedents for taking 
tax levels into account, and the absence of precedent supporting the 
interference argument, it seems doubtful that the interference argument 
succeeds as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
But even if requiring tax increases as a condition of bankruptcy relief 
complies with the Bankruptcy Code, there may still be a constitutional 
                                                     
285. See supra Part 0 
286. S. 2597, 94th Cong., § 805(e) (1975) (“[N]o . . . order . . . of the court may interfere with any 
of the political or governmental powers of the petitioner.”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 904(a)(1) (2012). 
287. 1975 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 95, at 217 (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Scalia). The references to fiscally sound budgets refer to provisions of the administration’s proposal 
that were not adopted in the enacted legislation. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 
Stat. 315; see also 11 U.S.C. § 904 (providing that bankruptcy court may not interfere with political 
or governmental powers of debtor “unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides”); S. REP. NO. 
95-989, at 110 (1978) (noting that the section reserving state power to control municipalities 
“provides that the municipality can consent to the court’s orders in regard to use of its income or 
property. It is contemplated that such consent will be required by the court for the issuance of 
certificates of indebtedness . . . . Such consent could extend to enforcement of the conditions 
attached to the certificates or the municipal services to be provided during the proceedings”).  
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question. Conditions the federal government attaches to benefits it 
confers may be unconstitutional even when states “voluntarily” 
accede.
288
 Although a complete discussion of the constitutional issues 
presented is beyond the scope of this Article,
289
 a preliminary look 
suggests that bankruptcy courts could require tax increases as a 
condition of bankruptcy relief without violating the unconstitutional-
conditions doctrine. This is so even after that doctrine’s recent 
reinvigoration in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, which held it unconstitutional for Congress to condition states’ 
Medicaid funding on their expansion of the program.
290
 
Most unconstitutional-conditions decisions about the limits of federal 
power to induce state action arise in markedly different contexts from 
municipal bankruptcy; most notably, they have arisen under the 
Spending Clause.
291
 Even granting that an analogy can be drawn 
between conditioning federal spending on state acquiescence to federal 
policies and conditioning federal bankruptcy relief on municipal 
acquiescence to federal policies,
292
 it seems doubtful that conditioning 
bankruptcy relief on certain tax levels would be unconstitutional. 
Professor Samuel Bagenstos has interpreted Sebelius in light of 
previous scholarship on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, 
concluding that three criteria must be met before a conditional spending 
                                                     
288. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2657, 2662 (2012) 
(noting that the Affordable Care Act “does not legally compel the States to participate in the 
expanded Medicaid program” but finding that the Act nonetheless “crosses the line from enticement 
to coercion”). 
289. In addition to the unconstitutional-conditions argument addressed in the text, it might be 
argued that considering tax levels in determining whether to grant bankruptcy relief violates the 
separation of powers. Such an argument would have to contend with Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 
33 (1990), which held that the federal judiciary may order municipalities to raise taxes, id. at 55–56, 
even when state law purports to require a popular vote on the type of tax increase in question. Id. at 
38; see also Bylinski v. City of Allen Park, 8 F. Supp. 2d 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 169 F.3d 
1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting challenge to consent decree requiring local tax increases, where 
challenge was on ground that state constitutional tax limits made the consent decree unlawful). It 
might be argued that Jenkins is inapplicable to tax levels in municipal bankruptcy because it dealt 
with federal courts’ remedial powers, but the Court relied on the remedial setting only in addressing 
a Tenth Amendment objection to imposition of taxes by a federal court, not a separation-of-powers 
objection. 495 U.S. at 55. As explained in the text, a Tenth Amendment challenge to federal courts’ 
ability to consider tax levels in bankruptcy appears weak for other reasons. 
290. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07. 
291. See, e.g., id. at 2662 (finding conditions on federal spending unconstitutional); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (1989) (listing 
unconstitutional-conditions challenges to federal spending). 
292. Proponents of such an analogy could look to United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51–53, 
(1938), in which the Court relied on the conditional-spending case of Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548 (1937), in rejecting the Tenth Amendment challenge to the 1937 Act. 
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program of Congress will be found unconstitutional: “[w]hen Congress 
takes an (1) entrenched federal program (2) that provides large sums to 
the states and (3) tells states that they can continue to participate in that 
program only if they also agree to participate in a separate and 
independent program, the condition is unconstitutionally coercive.”293 
Conditioning municipal bankruptcy relief on taxes does not clearly 
raise any of the issues Bagenstos identifies. First, considering taxes does 
not change the terms of an entrenched federal program,
294
 as taxes have 
been relevant to municipal bankruptcy relief from the beginning
295
 and 
states and municipalities cannot claim reliance on any particular version 
of the taxes-are-relevant requirement because there have not been 
enough cases to clearly ensconce any particular standard.
296
 Second, 
municipal bankruptcy is not analogous to a program that provides large 
sums to states because the total dollar amount of relief that has been 
afforded is quite small relative to state budgets
297
 and because the 
program is not too attractive to turn down;
298
 indeed, almost half of 
states in fact have turned it down.
299
 Third, tax levels are not separate 
                                                     
293. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 866 (2013) (numbering added). 
294. Id. at 874 (calling this the “no-new-conditions” principle); see also Seth F. Kreimer, 
Allocation Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 
1359 (1984) (“Losing a benefit previous provided seems different from simply never having been 
provided the benefit in the first place.”). 
295. See supra Section II.A. 
296. It could be argued that the tax-related requirement was not explicit enough. See, e.g., 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring conditions on federal 
spending to be imposed “unambiguously”). However, Pennhurst recognizes that legislative history 
can provide the required clarity. Id. at 18 (“[W]e find nothing in the Act or its legislative history to 
suggest that Congress intended” to impose the condition at issue in the case.). 
297. Detroit, the largest municipal bankruptcy in history, involved total debt (not debt reduction) 
of $18 billion. See supra note 14. This is about one-third of Michigan’s state budget for one year. 
See State of Michigan, Executive Budget: Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, at A-2, 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/Budget_all_together_2016_final_481096_7.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FYB5-X79C] (“The total Executive Budget Recommendation for fiscal year 2016, 
including all state and federal revenue sources, is $54 billion.”). By contrast, the Court thought the 
funds at stake in Sebelius entailed ten percent of the average affected state’s budget every year. See 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) (“[T]hreatened loss 
of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”). 
298. The gist of the “provides large sums” portion of the test is that states do not have a real 
choice to turn down federal funding if the amounts on offer are large enough. See Bagenstos, supra 
note 293, at 874 (calling this the “too-big-to-refuse” principle); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (states 
had “no real option” but to expand Medicaid eligibility with ten percent of state budgets at stake). 
299. See H. SLAYTON DABNEY, JR. ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN PERIL 11 (2012) (“Approximately 
half of the states do not permit municipalities to file at all.”). Contrast the situation in South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987), in which the Court found that Congress had not deprived states 
of the “freedom of the will” to decide the drinking age, even though all fifty states raised the 
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and independent from bankruptcy;
300
 making funds available to pay 
creditors is not just germane, but central to bankruptcy.
301
 
B. Implementing the Idea That Taxes Are Relevant 
This Section evaluates three possible specific ways, all suggested by 
the cases, of further specifying the notion that taxes are relevant: the 
“top-of-the-hill” criterion, which would require cities to raise taxes to 
the level that maximizes revenues, the “share-some-pain” criterion, 
which would require a substantial tax increase from existing levels, and 
the “top-of-the-range” criterion, which would require that taxes be at the 
top of a range of peer cities’ tax levels before cities can reduce their 
debts. 
This Section argues that a combination of the three tests deserves 
consideration. If a city is not at the top of a relevant comparison range, 
that should weigh heavily in determining that the city is not eligible for 
bankruptcy unless the city can explain the situation. Permissible 
explanations could include demonstrating that tax increases would not 
increase revenue, that tax increases are legally forbidden, or that 
bankruptcy is itself necessary for voter approval of tax increases.
302
 
Courts that prefer to phrase the test more crisply could adopt a rebuttable 
presumption of bad faith in filing or bad faith insolvency that is triggered 
when the city does not tax to the top of the range. In this formulation, the 
presumption could be rebutted by proof that tax increases would not 
raise money, are prohibited, or can be achieved only through 
bankruptcy. 
Likewise, at plan confirmation, a court should be prepared to find—
perhaps via a rebuttable presumption—that a plan that does not put the 
city at the top of a relevant comparison range is not in the best interests 
of creditors and is not fair and equitable to dissenting impaired classes 
                                                     
drinking age to twenty-one, just as Congress desired. Id. 
300. Cf. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (noting that Medicaid-expansion provisions were a “shift 
in kind, not merely in degree,” resulting in what was “in reality a new program”). 
301. Professor Charles Tabb points out the importance of creditor recovery in both liquidation 
and rehabilitation bankruptcy cases. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 3 (3d 
ed. 2014) (“Liquidation bankruptcy cases serve two independent purposes: relief of debtors, and 
equitable treatment of creditors.”); id. at 6 (noting that, in rehabilitation cases, “all [creditors] may 
benefit from capturing a going-concern surplus out of the debtor’s future positive earnings”). 
302. This exception assumes that state laws requiring electoral approval of taxes are not 
preempted in bankruptcy. At least one court has found that state-law electoral approval 
requirements survive in bankruptcy. See In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 53–54 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
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unless the city can proffer an explanation.
303
 Given Congress’ concern 
that local populations and communities might abuse bankruptcy, it is 
much more doubtful that electoral impossibility, standing alone, should 
be an acceptable explanation. Even if bankruptcy courts cannot order tax 
increases and even if state electoral approval requirements are valid in 
bankruptcy in light of the Supremacy Clause, courts are not required to 
lend their imprimatur to a plan that discharges debts when local 
taxpayers are not doing their part. 
The criteria set forth here apply to taxes and not spending. As a 
practical matter, most general-purpose cities that have entered 
bankruptcy have cut discretionary spending to the point where service 
levels are low,
304
 and there are probably limits on how far spending cuts 
can go, assuming cities must provide some minimal level of service.
305
 
Thus, it makes sense to look to taxes as a source of creditor recovery. 
Moreover, much of the legislative history addresses taxes specifically, as 
opposed to spending.
306
 In light of these facts, it makes sense to discuss a 
tax-specific standard, although it is possible that bankruptcy law does 
require spending cuts in some circumstances.
307
 
In reviewing these proposed criteria, it is important to keep in mind 
that they do not represent general guides to tax policy. This Article does 
not argue that cities generally should tax to the top of their peer range or 
that tax increases are presumptively desirable in general. Instead, the 
Article has argued that, in the very specific context where a municipality 
seeks to invoke the federal bankruptcy power to eliminate valid debts, 
Congress intended that the city’s actual and potential revenues are 
relevant to the solution. 
Thus, the tests discussed here do not specify what tax levels are 
                                                     
303. If a city successfully argued at the eligibility stage that it should be allowed to file 
bankruptcy because that is the only way it can raise taxes, that presumably would be an independent 
ground to require the city to tax to the top of the range at confirmation. This could be accomplished 
through the requirement that plans be filed in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (incorporating 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) into Chapter 9 by reference); id. § 1129(a)(3) (requiring that the plan be 
“proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law”). 
304. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
305. See Anderson, supra note 26, at 1188–95 (discussing city residents’ entitlements to services 
in bankruptcy). 
306. See supra Part 0 
307. The Detroit and Stockton courts both pointed to “service delivery insolvency,” the delivery 
of a critically low level of city services, as integral to their determinations that the insolvency test of 
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) was met. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013); In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789–90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). Although these cases 
do not state in clear terms that bankruptcy eligibility requires service delivery insolvency, they do 
suggest that service levels are relevant to the insolvency determination, at least in some cases. 
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desirable or “affordable” in the general sense of the term. Instead, the 
tests specify what tax level is so unaffordable that charging it is a worse 
alternative than having a bankruptcy court lend its imprimatur to the 
city’s failure to meet legitimate obligations to bona fide creditors. 
Municipal insolvency creates suffering, and the criteria discussed here 
are guides for sharing that suffering in light of Congress’s objectively 
manifested intent. They are not policy prescriptions for cities that are 
financially healthy, or even for distressed municipalities that are not 
seeking federal bankruptcy protection. 
1. “Top of the Hill” 
One criterion that has at least indirect support in the legislative 
history
308
 and case law
309
 is the “top-of-the-hill” criterion, which would 
require that a municipality raise taxes to the revenue-maximizing level, 
either before filing as a condition of eligibility or after filing as a 
condition of plan confirmation. The criterion thus incorporates the 
assumption that increasing tax rates beyond a certain point—beyond the 
“top of the hill,” or the “peak of the Laffer Curve”310—actually reduces 
the amount of revenue the taxes generate. The criterion is easy to 
articulate and to understand on a conceptual level and holds out the 
promise of objective application. 
Implementation of the top-of-the-hill criterion is likely to be a 
challenge for courts. There are questions arising from the different types 
of taxes and their interaction. (For instance, if a city sets its sales tax at 
the revenue-maximizing level, should it also have to adopt a hotel excise 
tax? What if increasing the revenue from one tax decreases the revenue 
from others?) But the bigger challenge lies in coming up with a credible 
estimate of the revenue hill itself. How is a court to know if a 10% 
property tax will encourage residents to move out and depress property 
values enough so that it yields less revenue than a 9.5% property tax? 
This challenge, though daunting, does not appear to be categorically 
more difficult than other factual questions law endeavors to answer, 
often with the help of expert testimony. For example, antitrust law 
requires courts to determine whether the effect of combining two firms 
                                                     
308. General references to the “maximum capacity to pay,” see supra Section II.A, or to paying 
“to the fullest extent possible,” see supra Section II.B, can be interpreted as reflecting the top-of-
the-hill criterion. There are also occasional more explicit references in the legislative history to the 
concept. See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 173, 237–41, 248–55 and accompanying text. 
310. For an explanation of the Laffer Curve, see supra note 113. 
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“may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”311 This often requires complex and deeply contestable 
analyses of competition and market power. For example, a federal 
district court evaluating the proposed merger of Staples and Office 
Depot undertook to determine whether a small but significant price 
increase in Staples’ prices would “cause a significant number of 
consumers to turn to non-superstore alternatives for purchasing their 
consumable office supplies”312—a hypothetical inquiry that required 
consideration of thousands of items of inventory across the locations of 
two nationwide chains.
313
 Within bankruptcy law, courts in corporate 
reorganization cases routinely face intimidating valuation challenges,
314
 
such as appraising Lehman Brothers’ derivative positions.315 Indeed, 
determining the subjective intent of a human actor—a question the 
judicial system answers thousands of times each day—is arguably less 
tractable than doing the kind of tax analysis the top-of-the-hill test calls 
for.
316
 Given that empirical work on how to determine the top of the hill 
already exists,
317
 parties presumably would be able to proffer expert 
                                                     
311. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
312. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1078 (D.D.C. 1997). 
313. Id. at 1076 (discussing price samples considered by court, including one accounting for 
ninety percent of Staples’ sales and another of approximately 2000 items). More recently, the 
Bazaarvoice court was called upon to decide, among other things, whether firms such as Google, 
Facebook, and IBM would constrain the market power Bazaarvoice would achieve in the business-
to-business review and rating market as a result of its acquisition of rival PowerReviews. See United 
States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *38–54 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 
2014). This analysis does not seem qualitatively more difficult than the analysis of tax effects the 
top-of-the-hill test requires. 
314. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 546 (8th ed. 2011) (noting 
that, if creditors object to proposed plan, “it is up to the “bankruptcy court to determine what the 
true value of the corporation is”); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-
Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 801 n.167 (2011) (discussing 
competing expert testimony relating to valuation of Calpine Corporation in its bankruptcy, with 
range of values from $11.9 to $25.5 billion). 
315. See Michael J. Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, 
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2014, at 175, 185–87 (detailing difficulties with valuation of 
Lehman’s derivative positions); Megan Murphy & Anousha Sakoui, Nomura Sued over Lehman 
Claims, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea856378-4f38-11df-b8f4-
00144feab49a.html#axzz46uIT6ohc [https://perma.cc/7AZF-JZN3] (describing Lehman liquidator’s 
assertion that Nomura used valuations that were “commercially unreasonable” and “divorced from 
economic reality” in making claims against Lehman’s bankruptcy estate). 
316. Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (2015) (“There is no fundamental difference between inferring an 
evidentiary ‘fact’ from the competing testimony of various eyewitnesses, and inferring the market 
value of an asset from data and the competing testimony of financial experts.”). 
317. See, e.g., Andrew Haughwout et al., Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 
86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 570, 582–83 (2004) (cited in Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 46, at 
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testimony on the relevant questions. 
Thus, although the top-of-the-hill criterion is probably harder to apply 
than other tests, that issue is not totally disqualifying. The more 
fundamental problem with the top-of-the-hill criterion is that the notion 
that financially strapped cities really are obligated to use every last 
ounce of their taxing power to get revenues is so extreme. Despite the 
indirect support for the test in some legislative and judicial statements, 
no court has actually gone so far as to embrace it unequivocally, and 
congressional statements that could be read as endorsing the standard 
could be discounted as rhetorical excess. 
2. “Share Some Pain” 
The Stockton confirmation opinion repeatedly mentions the fact that 
Stockton increased its sales tax as part of its plan of adjustment.
318
 
Indeed, the opinion emphasizes that the sales tax increase was the largest 
and longest-lasting sales tax increase possible under California law.
319
 
The exact role of the tax increase in the Stockton court’s reasoning is 
open to debate: the court cited the tax increase as a reason that there 
would be enough money to fund Stockton’s plan,320 but also arguably 
found that the tax increase supported the overall fairness of the 
settlement.
321
 Nevertheless, Stockton suggests the possibility of a 
standard based not on absolute tax or revenue levels, but on whether 
there is a substantial increase in taxes during the bankruptcy. 
Requiring a nontrivial tax increase from current levels has some merit 
as a way of implementing Congress’s desire that courts incorporate 
revenues into their analysis of municipal bankruptcy. By imposing some 
level of sacrifice on the populace, the requirement goes some way 
toward meeting Congress’s requirement that populations pay all they 
reasonably can before taking advantage of bankruptcy protection. But 
there are two problems with the criterion. First, unless the court adopts 
                                                     
283 n.10). 
318. In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 54, 61–62 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015); Stockton Transcript, 
supra note 164, at 19, 34. 
319. Stockton, 526 B.R. at 61. 
320. Id. (“The ability to pay the capital market creditors the agreed amounts contemplated a tax 
increase that, under California law, required a vote of the people.”); Stockton Transcript supra note 
164, at 34 (“I am satisfied that there are adequate means for the Plan’s implementation, and 
particularly that the taxpayers have stepped up and approved the measure that added a local sales 
tax to the extent permitted by California law . . . .”) 
321. Stockton, 526 B.R. at 53–54 (describing tax increases in context of mediated compromise); 
Stockton Transcript, supra note 164, at 19 (contrasting settlement involving tax increase with 
assertion that pensions should be impaired). 
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the unlikely interpretation that a city must implement the highest legally 
permitted tax increases, the test is not determinate. It is not clear just 
how large a tax increase would be required to satisfy the standard. 
Second, it seems that the standard imposed by Congress is based on 
absolute tax levels,
322
 rather than the amount taxes are increased in the 
bankruptcy itself. The legislative history and case law nowhere suggest 
that absolute tax levels are irrelevant, as would be implied by strict 
application of the share-some-pain criterion and only the share-some-
pain criterion. 
3. “Top of the Range” 
Cases that evaluate a municipality’s tax level relative to taxes in peer 
communities suggest a third standard, the “top-of-the-range” standard. 
For example, the court in In re Town of Westlake referred to tax rates in 
other cities, including Fort Worth and a set of “comparable cities,”323 not 
to the legal or economic maximum. Similarly, the court in In re 
Chilhowee R-IV School District supported its finding that the 
municipality acted in good faith by noting that “the school board [was] 
already assessing the highest levy in the county.”324 Another court, in In 
re McCurtain Municipal Authority, found that a municipal water and 
sewer authority did not file in bad faith where the authority’s water and 
sewer rates were “significantly higher than rates in surrounding 
areas.”325 
The “top-of-the-range” criterion would require that a municipality tax 
at a higher level than its peers before the municipality would be able to 
                                                     
322. See supra Part 0 
323. In re Town of Westlake, Texas, 211 B.R. 860, 867 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997). The court 
concluded that the “maximum realized tax revenues” from an ad valorem tax would be $40,000 to 
$80,000, apparently corresponding to a rate of $0.50 to $1.00. This figure is below the “maximum 
permissible tax rate” of $1.50 per $100 valuation. The court apparently drew the endpoints of its 
$0.50 to $1.00 rate range from comparisons to other cities. The high end of the court’s range, $1.00, 
apparently came from a comparison to Fort Worth, which had a rate of $0.98, which the court 
described as being “on the high side.” The low end of the court’s range, $0.50, is the approximate 
midpoint of a range of “comparable cities.” The comparable-city range ran from $0.35 to $0.60. 
324. In re Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 145 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992). (noting that 
the school district facing large judgment for discharged teachers did not act in bad faith: “[t]o say 
that they had to institute the highest possible levy (requiring state approval) before taking any other 
action or be guilty of bad faith filing, is unrealistic”). 
325. In re McCurtain Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 
Dec. 4, 2007) (holding that the municipal water and sewer authority did not file in bad faith where 
water and sewer rates in the municipality were “significantly higher than rates in surrounding areas” 
and “it is unlikely that sufficient funds could have been generated through the imposition of higher 
water and sewer rates or an assessment on [local] citizens”). 
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adjust its debts in bankruptcy. If the municipality did not meet the 
criterion before bankruptcy, the municipality would have to do so as a 
condition of plan confirmation. Specifically, applying the criterion 
would require constructing a peer group, establishing a basis for 
comparing tax levels among the peers, and determining whether the 
debtor’s tax levels were high enough in light of the comparison. 
Applying the top-of-the-range criterion would not be totally 
straightforward and uncontestable. Disputes could occur at each of the 
three stages of application: assembling the peer group, constructing the 
comparable measure of tax levels, and evaluating whether the debtor’s 
tax levels are high enough relative to its peers’. 
Construction of the comparison group necessarily would be case-
specific. The point is to assemble a group of cities with similar ability to 
raise tax revenue, or fiscal capacity. It is impossible to assess the debtor 
against a group of totally identical cities, but there should be some effort 
to control for the major determinants of ability to raise tax revenue. For 
example, states vary greatly in their tax regimes,
326
 so that in a typical 
case it would seem to make sense to compare the debtor against 
municipalities in its own state.
327
 Likewise, special districts should be 
compared with special districts of the same type, and for general 
governments to be compared with general governments. 
The debtor should be compared to cities of comparable income levels 
and property values, as these characteristics both are the bases for 
taxation and likely measure the ability to pay taxes. Economists have 
already devised a measure that may be useful in this regard: the 
Representative Tax System approach, which “measures local tax 
capacity by applying average—or ‘representative’—tax rates to all tax 
bases that local governments are authorized to tax.”328 This approach 
theoretically would allow the debtor to be compared against all other 
cities that have the same elements in the tax base; for example, if the 
debtor may tax property and income only, its tax capacity could be 
                                                     
326. See, e.g., Bo Zhao, The Fiscal Impact of Potential Local-Option Taxes in Massachusetts 2–3 
(New England Pub. Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. 10-2, 2010) (reporting that all states do not 
allow local-option taxes, and that thirty-six states impose local general sales taxes, twenty-seven 
states allow local jurisdictions to impose meals taxes, and that fourteen states collect revenues from 
local income or payroll taxes). 
327. To the extent that a major metropolis such as Detroit is sui generis, this requirement might 
have to be relaxed and the city might have to be compared to national peers, with adjustments made 
for differing state tax regimes. It is not clear that major cities really are sui generis under an 
approach like the Representative Tax System, however. 
328. Zhao, supra note 326, at 7 (citing several other articles that make use of the Representative 
Tax System). 
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compared with all other cities that may tax property and income only. 
Use of this method depends on assuming that tax capacity as measured 
by the Representative Tax System is a good proxy for ability to pay. 
Another area on which parties and courts could draw in applying the 
top-of-the-range criterion is “interest arbitration,” a process that is 
widely used for determining public-sector wages when collective 
bargaining does not reach an agreement, particularly when employees 
are not allowed to strike.
329
 Interest-arbitration statutes typically direct 
the arbitrator to consider the public employer’s ability to pay,330 and the 
evidence that is considered on that score typically entails comparisons 
with other cities,
331
 often on the basis of similarities of population, scope 
of duties, and location.
332
 
As the foregoing suggests, it will be crucial in creating the 
comparison group to decide whether the comparison group should be 
composed of cities with comparable service levels. If service levels are 
not taken into account, then the debtor might be required to impose 
higher taxes as a condition of relief just because citizens in an otherwise 
comparable city wanted higher service levels and therefore adopted 
higher taxes. The argument that it is unfair to require higher taxes on the 
debtor just because its peer happened to want more services might be 
countered in part by observing the Congress’s intention appears to be 
that cities that have incurred high debts may have to make do with lower 
service levels; losing the freedom to choose low taxes and low service 
may be a consequence of incurring unsustainable debt and seeking 
                                                     
329. See Joseph Slater, Interest Arbitration as Alternative Dispute Resolution: The History from 
1919 to 2011, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 400 (2013) (“Approximately thirty states use 
binding interest arbitration as the final step in public-sector impasse resolutions for at least some 
public employees.”). 
330. Id. at 400 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22(9)(c) (West 2010) (specifying “ability of the 
public employer to finance economic adjustments” as criterion); id. at 403 (citing OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4117.14(G)(7)(c) (West 2012) (specifying “ability of the public employer to finance and 
administer the issues proposed” as criterion)); id. at 404 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-34-
103(5)(b) (West 2009) (specifying “financial ability of the public employer to pay” as criterion)). 
331. See, e.g., Joan Parker, Judicial Review and Legislative Response: The New Jersey Collective 
Bargaining Experience, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
EIGHT STATES 21, 33–37 (Joyce M. Najita & James M. Stern eds., 2001) (describing use of 
comparable municipalities and employment in setting public-sector salaries in interest arbitration); 
Joseph Slater, Attacks on Public-Sector Bargaining as Attacks on Employee Voice: A Partial 
Defence of the Wagner Act Model, 56 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 875, 886 (2013) (describing 
consideration of how much “comparable employees are paid in comparable jurisdictions” in interest 
arbitration in United States); Slater, supra note 329, at 399–408 (2013) (describing use of 
“comparables” to determine how much cities can afford to pay in labor interest arbitrations). 
332. Slater, supra note 329, at 406–07 (quoting White Lake Twp. & Police Officers Labor 
Council, No. D06 G-1698 (Mich. Emp’t Rels. Comm’n 2008)). 
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bankruptcy protection.
333
 
After the comparison group is assembled, the court would have to 
compare tax levels across the group, taking account of the fact that there 
are different taxes that may be set at different levels relative to each 
other. However, this step of the analysis by using the total amount of 
money collected as a common basis of comparison. Doing so could 
render this step of the process as simple as looking at taxes collected as a 
percentage of tax capacity across the comparison group.
334
 
The final step in the analysis is to determine whether the debtor’s 
taxes meet the top-of-the-range criterion. Applying the idea of the top of 
the range is a quintessential line-drawing exercise, and any effort to 
define it will be challenged on the ground that the line could have been 
drawn somewhere else. 
One possible specification would be to look to the absolute top of the 
range; under this specification, the debtor must impose taxes at or higher 
than the highest rate of any of its peers. This approach yields a 
determinate standard that plausibly honors congressional intent to 
require municipalities to do all they reasonably can before receiving 
federal bankruptcy relief, and it seems to be consistent with how the top-
of-the-range criterion has been applied in the limited case law to date. 
However, the approach is extreme and ignores all peers other than the 
highest-taxing one. 
Another approach would be to require taxation in the top quintile. The 
quintile has some precedent as a cutoff point in evaluating taxes,
335
 and 
the quintile approach may not allow a single peer to set taxes, depending 
on the number of peers. 
A third approach would be to interpret the top of the range as the top 
half of the range; above-median taxes would be enough to qualify the 
debtor for bankruptcy relief. This standard is determinate and represents 
defensible line-drawing—if the debtor is not in the top half of the cities, 
it probably is not at the top of the range. On the other hand, it may not 
                                                     
333. It seems that a municipality should be excluded from the debtor’s comparison group if the 
municipality is itself insolvent or in financial distress. Also, if the top of the range puts taxes so high 
relative to service levels that revenue will actually decrease because of noncompliance or declines 
in property values or population, the municipality should be able to make that argument. The top-of-
the-range criterion would apply only to tax rates that are on the upward slope of the revenue hill. 
334. See, e.g., Liz Malm & Gerald Prante, Annual State-Local Tax Burden Ranking FY 2011, 
TAX FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/annual-state-local-tax-burden-ranking-
fy-2011 [https://perma.cc/UW8A-8QH6] (comparing tax burdens across states as a percentage of 
residents’ income). 
335. Zhao, supra note 326, at 8, 12–13 (analyzing tax capacity by quintile and in particular 
comparing top and bottom quintiles). 
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ask enough of the debtor to meet congressional intent. 
Finally, the court could allow the comparison group itself to 
determine what “top of the range” means in the particular context. A plot 
of the comparison group’s tax rates on a histogram might yield an 
obvious gap between the top and the rest of the range, but this approach 
probably will not always work, depending on the data. Cluster analysis, 
a field of study prominent in artificial intelligence research, offers a 
more formal version of this approach. This field uses algorithms that 
“separate a finite, unlabeled data set into a finite and discrete set of 
‘natural,’ hidden data structures.”336 Thus, it seems that cluster analysis 
theoretically could be used not just to determine what cities constitute 
the top group in a range, but also to determine the comparable group 
itself. Where this approach will work, with or without formal cluster 
analysis, it appears preferable due to the fact that it takes advantage of 
the data that is actually before the court. 
The top-of-the-range criterion respects congressional intent to require 
some degree of sacrifice in the form of taxation before granting 
bankruptcy relief. It is less extreme and arguably more realistic than the 
top-of-the-hill criterion; after all, it requires only that the city charge 
taxes at the same level that some of its peers are already charging. The 
top-of-the-range criterion does not perfectly capture the idea that a 
municipality should not be able to spend itself into insolvency 
deliberately in order to avoid its debts, but the criterion makes such a 
strategy considerably less attractive because a city employing the 
strategy would have to charge comparatively high taxes as part of its 
bankruptcy. 
The top-of-the-range criterion probably is also easier to apply than the 
top-of-the-hill criterion. The two criteria seem equally easy to articulate 
and to understand conceptually, but applying the top-of-the-hill criterion 
necessarily involves a hypothetical exercise in determining what would 
happen if tax rates were increased, while the top-of-the-range criterion 
could entail only a comparison of actual tax levels across cities. The top-
of-the-range criterion is arguably more workable than the top-of-the-hill 
criterion and more determinate than the share-some-pain criterion. The 
top-of-the-range criterion is a plausible way of implementing Congress’s 
will, especially when incorporated into a framework that uses the other 
criteria as well. 
                                                     
336. RUI XU & DONALD C. WUNSCH, II, CLUSTERING 2 (2009). 
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4. Combining the Criteria 
As noted previously, this Article suggests that a municipality should 
tax to the top of the range, both at the eligibility stage and the plan 
confirmation stage, unless it can offer an explanation. Acceptable 
explanations would include that tax increases would be 
counterproductive because they would reduce revenue, would be legally 
forbidden, or would be electorally impossible without bankruptcy. The 
latter explanation would be accepted only at the confirmation stage. 
Taxing to the level of one’s highest-taxing peers seems reasonably 
calculated to capture the notion of paying “as much as reasonably 
possible” that comes through in the statutes’ legislative history. The top-
of-the-range criterion is probably more workable and is in principle less 
extreme and therefore more workable than the top-of-the-hill criterion, 
because it does not require taxation to the utmost extent of revenue-
generating capacity. In some cases, however, it will be plausible that 
raising taxes to the top of the comparable range will be 
counterproductive—the top of the hill may be reached at a lower tax 
level than the top of the range. In such cases, the city should be able to 
tax to the top of the hill. Thus, the framework suggested here contains 
elements of both the top-of-the-range and the top-of-the-hill tests. 
Although adding an analysis of the top of the hill to an analysis of the 
top of the range would sacrifice the judicial economy of using the latter 
criterion that would happen only in the subset of cases where the top-of-
the-hill criterion is questioned. 
The Article envisions using the top-of-the-range criterion for both 
bankruptcy eligibility and plan confirmation. Judicial precedent supports 
the notion that taxes are relevant at both stages, and neither the 
legislative history nor the case law—in most cases—gives a basis for 
making taxes relevant in different ways at different stages. Stockton is 
the exception; it suggests that the tax criterion should not be applied at 
the eligibility stage when bankruptcy is what will make tax increases 
feasible. This Article suggests that municipalities should be able to make 
the “Stockton argument,” and its framework thus can be seen as 
influenced by the share-some-pain test. The framework suggested in this 
Article thus synthesizes the three distinct specific ideas about taxes in 
municipal bankruptcy that can be discerned from the legislative history 
and case law. 
There is no clear congressional command that inescapably compels 
the use of any specific test or framework to give shape to the idea that 
taxes are relevant; the open-ended municipal bankruptcy statute reflects 
an idea about taxes that, though unmistakably and consistently present, 
was vaguely expressed. Thus, filling the gap between the vague direction 
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the statute provides and a workable standard necessarily entails adding 
substance, and the result can always be challenged. But fidelity to 
congressional intent requires the effort to establish some workable 
standard, imperfect though the result will be. This Article has presented 
such a standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress intended to limit bankruptcy relief to municipalities that 
cannot reasonably meet their obligations, and it intended for bankruptcy 
courts to consider tax levels in making that determination. No one 
section of the statute expressly makes tax levels relevant; instead, courts 
have found the idea inherent in four different statutory provisions. Thus, 
although the case that taxes are relevant is solid, how exactly they are 
relevant is unclear. This Article advances the discussion on just how 
taxes have to be before a municipality is eligible for bankruptcy and can 
have a plan confirmed. The Article has suggested that courts should first 
ask whether a municipality is taxing as high as its peers. If the debtor is 
not taxing at that level, it should be allowed to explain why not: perhaps 
doing so is legally impossible or economically infeasible, or perhaps 
bankruptcy will itself be a way of obtaining more revenue. Congress did 
not state its intention precisely, so no specific relationship between tax 
levels and municipal bankruptcy is plainly compelled by the statute, but 
this Article has argued that a combination of the three criteria suggested 
in the case law—top-of-the-hill, share-some-pain, and top-of-the-
range— is a pragmatic way of carrying out Congress’s command. 
 
